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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL SECTOR IN THE 
ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT OF ETHIOPIA: 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRE- AND POSIT-REFORM 
PERIOD 
 
BY  
 
KYDAKI GEZAHEGN 
 
 
Since the Debt Crisis of 1982 and rapid Voluntary capital inflow restriction to the 
developing countries, the financial liberalization models increasingly dominant policy 
advocated by the IMF and the World Bank. Today, it is a conventional wisdom that 
financial liberalization is the most efficient way for the financial sector and overall 
economic growth. Thus, the study seeks to make comparative study of the performance 
of the financial sector before and after the economic reform of Ethiopia. 
 
Thus, the paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter concerned with 
introductory part. All the technical questions related to the study such as problem 
statement, objective of the study, methodology and scope of the study are discussed in 
this section. The second chapter reviews the literatures that related to this study. 
Chapter three concentrates on overall review of the Ethiopian economy in different 
periods. The fourth chapter is the core of the study that receives a wide coverage in 
the literature. Finally, the fifth chapter concludes the study and recommends a policy on 
the bases of the findings. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
    1.1 General Introduction 
 
In the past few decades, most developing countries suffered from continuous economic 
crises and policy shortcomings. Ethiopia is one of these countries, which mainly 
depends on agricultural production. Agriculture accounts for about 50% of GDP, 80% 
employment, 90% of export earning and 70% of raw materials for medium and large 
industries. Ethiopia, with an area of about 1.1 million square kilometers (the 9th largest) 
and population of about 60 million (the 3rd most populous) country in the African 
continent. It has diverse physical features with a variety of agro-ecological zones that 
are favorable for agricultural production. It is also the largest in life stock population in 
Africa. 
 
However, Ethiopia is the least developed country in the world mainly due to policy 
failure for many decades. In fact, natural resources are not determinant factors for 
wealth. The biggest difference between rich and poor countries is the efficiency with 
which they have used their resources. The World Bank (1989) reports that Hong Kong, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore have had among the world’s highest per 
capita income growth rates despite their relatively poor resource endowments during 
the past three decades. Resource-rich Argentina has hardly grown at all (World Bank, 
1989:26). The same is true for Ethiopia in resource underutilization predominantly 
attributed to policy problems. Moreover, drought repeatedly affects the agricultural 
production owing to the dependence on nature. In 1989, for instance, only 4.6% of the 
irrigeable potential was put for use. The rapid Demographic change with high 
dependence ratio as well as long and devastating civil war before 1991 were also 
contributed for the economic stagnation in the last decades. According to Annual Report 
on the Ethiopian Economy (1999/2000) recurrent expenditure was rising fast, partly 
owing to the government's expenditure on defense rising from 14.1% of GDP in 1973/74 
to over 26% in 1987/88 out of which general government outlay accounted for 15%. 
 
The monetary and financial policies were directed to fulfil annual plans before the 
reform. Therefore, the pre-reform period was attributed to policies of discriminatory 
interest rate, credit allocation and foreign exchange. The financial institutions were 
made to provide credit to inefficient public enterprises and state farms at preferential 
interest rates. Due to the government’s crowding out effect, very little amount of 
financial resources were available to the more efficient private sector. 
 
Thus, after the reform, the market-oriented economic policy wishes to establish a 
modern competitive financial system. The present government adopted a policy 
undertaking on the basis of gradualism and sequence of financial liberalization. The 
monetary and credit policies were made to ensure the growth of monetary aggregates 
consistent with the growth of GDP and inflation. Discriminatory interest rate policy to 
channel credit to privileged sector was eliminated. The private sector was allowed to 
participate in the financial sector whereas the specialized government banks were 
restructured. Since January 1995, auction market for Treasury Bills was introduced to 
avoid the crowding out effect of government borrowing from the banking system while 
laying the foundation for the development of capital market. Micro-financing institutions, 
which are specialized in providing credit to the emerging small enterprises and farmers, 
were established. The monetary and banking proclamations gave the National Bank of 
Ethiopia (NBE) increased autonomy to supervise the banking system. Although the NBE 
has set the minimum deposit rate, the lending rate was deregulated since January 1998. 
 
   1.2 Objective of the study 
 Shortage of financial resource is usually regarded as the most important problem for the 
development of many developing countries. Therefore, credit has been recognized as 
one of the important way to finance investment by mobilizing savings. Thus, the general 
objective of this study is to assess the performance of financial system in the economic 
development of Ethiopia. Specifically, the study compares and contrasts the 
performance of financial system before and after the economic reform. To achieve this 
objective the paper concentrates more on the savings and domestic resource 
mobilization of the financial system as well as the allocational and operational efficiency 
of the banks. 
 
The study also tries to overview the activities of informal financial system. In 
developing countries like Ethiopia informal financial sector provides services to the 
non-corporate sectors such as individuals, small farmers and small business enterprises. 
This institution tends to help clients that formal institution often finds too costly or 
risky to serve. Moreover, in Ethiopia the volume of financial resource that is channeled 
by the sector is not negligible. It is this sector that covers the majority of population 
living in the rural areas. Thus, this paper tends to review the change in this sector after 
the reform with reference to the activities in the pre-reform period. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
This study employs descriptive analysis to compare and contrast the performance of 
the financial system and the overall economy during the two periods. Thus, growth 
rates, ratios, percentages, etc. are used to make the comparison in the analysis. The 
period of analysis categorized into two sub-periods in which the country was passed 
through the two different economic systems. The period from 1983/84 to 1990/91 is 
part of centrally planned economy and the remaining period from 1991/92 to 1998/99 is 
the market oriented economic system. 
 
The Economic reform was actually begun in 1992/93. However, the period is assumed 
as if it started in 1991/92 in the analysis due to the fact that the idea of the market-
oriented economic policy and its implementation had begun immediately after the new 
government took over the power in May 1991 (end of fiscal year 1990/91). In this 
analysis pairs of years are used due to difference in the fiscal year of Ethiopia and the 
Gregorian calendar. June 30 of every year is the end of the budget year. 
 The data for this analysis is collected from various institutions and literatures. Some of 
the information like credit disbursement by sector is collected from the commercial 
bank of Ethiopia. Since the commercial bank is the dominant banking industry in 
Ethiopia and for the lack of data from other banks in some information, the data 
obtained from the commercial bank has found to be enough to give sound conclusion in 
the analysis of banking industry. In this study, a lot of efforts are made especially to 
collect the data and organize them as in the tables due to the lack of well-organized 
data from the institutions. For the same reason, some of the data is organized from 
literatures. In addition to the data used for the analysis from various sources, different 
literatures have been reviewed to enrich the paper. 
 
1.4 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
 
The core interest of this study is to compare and contrast the performance of financial 
sector during the two different economic systems. Due to limited time available, the 
analysis gives emphasis only on major activities such as deposit mobilization and credit 
operation. Detail discussions are not made in some activities of the financial sector like 
the case in the informal financial sector, which is very important in Ethiopia. Further 
research is needed to assess the performance and the role of this sector. The 
information for the analysis is limited to only sixteen years (since 1983/84), excluding 
the information of the 1960s and 70s.  This study also does not compare the financial 
system of Ethiopia with any other country. 
CHAPTER TWO 
                        LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Financial Development and Economic Growth 
 
The relationship between development of financial system and economic growth has 
been extensively studied for a long time. Investment in physical and human capital is 
the most important factor for economic growth. One of the most important factors 
determining investment is the availability of financial resource. The common 
assumption in the model of financial development and economic growth is that saving is 
a pre-condition to investment and hence economic growth. This assumption is no longer 
valid in countries with developed banking and financial systems of their own or access 
to the international financial markets. Therefore, Studart noted that: 
In contemporary post Keynesian theory, finance in monetary production 
economy is sharply distinguished from saving-which is said to derive from, 
rather than be a precondition for, growth. Investment is the motor of 
accumulation and finance is what permits investment decision to materialize. 
The supply of finance is causally determined by banks: it is banks, and not 
savers, who hold a key position in the process of growth. Only if they share the 
optimism of entrepreneurs in periods of growth or are led, for any other reason, 
to accommodate the demand for investment finance, can the monetary 
production economy grow. This conclusion would appear to leave no role for 
savings and, hence, for capital markets, but such is far from being the case 
(Studart, 1995:1).      
Fry (1996) investigates that the role of financial conditions have played in producing the 
virtuous circles of high saving, investment, output growth and export growth in sample 
of Pacific Basin countries during the past few decades. In the Pacific Basin regions, as 
elsewhere, there is much higher correlation between growth and saving ratio than there 
is between growth and investment ratios (Fry, 1996:140). He argues that the causality 
runs predominantly from growth to saving, it runs both ways, albeit less strongly, in the 
case of investment. He demonstrates that Singapore has posted the highest investment 
ratio in the Pacific Basin region at 41% of GNP in the past decades. However, Hong 
Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand achieved higher growth rates than Singapore. Hence, 
high growth rates were associated with high saving ratios but not necessarily with high 
investment ratios.  A high national saving-investment balance depreciates the real 
exchange rates so stimulates export growth. Since export growth stimulates output 
growth, this may form the link between saving-investment balance and output growth 
(ibid: pp.141). 
 
Park also argues that causality can run in both directions. The growth and diversity of 
financial instruments, markets and participants can stimulate savings and investment, as 
well as the economy’s allocative efficiency. Or financial development can simply be an 
aspect of economic growth whose main cause is elsewhere (Park, 1994:10).  
 
In the same way, the empirical analysis of Fry shows that the relationship between the 
real interest rates and growth resemble an inverted U-shape. This implies that both very 
high and very low rates of interest reduce the growth of output through the effects of the 
rates of investment productivity. Thus, Fry concludes that a reduction in real interest 
rates below its equilibrium level by 1% point requires an increase in the investment 
ratio by 1% point in order to maintain a fixed rate of growth. And he also cited that 
Polak (1989) reported the same result in his econometric estimates for a sample of 40 
developing countries over the period of 1965-85 (Fry, 1996:152). Nam (1992) has noted 
that the major motivation of still regulating most interest rates in Korea is to keep 
lending rates from raising too high and to avoid any financial panic for business firms 
whose capital structure is generally very weak (pp.45).  
 
However, Morisset (1991) argues that because the principal constraint on investment is 
quantity, rather the cost, of financial resources in developing countries, a rise in the 
interest rates will increase the supply of credit to finance private investment (pp.3). 
Policies that impose artificially low interest rate ceilings in developing countries tend to 
constrain the supply of capital and lead to excess demand for capital. 
 
The theoretical and empirical investigation of the relationship between financial markets 
and economic growth by Murinde (1996) brings together two of the latest innovations in 
development economics (new growth theory and the current interest in financial 
markets), to study the determinants of economic growth. His empirical finding on 7 
Pacific Basin countries is weak to support the prediction of the endogenous growth 
theory that the financial markets have played a significant role in the growth of these 
economies. Among three financial markets studied, only the stock market has played a 
significant role. The remaining credit and bond markets are weak to support the theory.  
 
In the other literatures, the credit and bond markets are found to be important 
determinants of economic growth. Particularly, in the early stages of development, 
economic policy should be more focused on the creation of efficient banking systems 
than stock market. Carlin and Mayer (1999) have noted that in countries with high GDP 
per capita, growth of equity- and high skill-dependent industries is promoted through 
information disclosure encouraging expenditure on R&D rather than fixed capital 
formation and through concentrations of ownership providing commitments to other 
stakeholders. In contrast, in countries with lower GDP per capita, banking systems are 
important in promoting bank finance dependent industries and dispersed ownership is 
required to control agency problems in skill-intensive and equity financed industries 
(Carlin & Mayer, 1999:25). 
 
In their empirical study of interactions between financial development and economic 
growth, Berthelemy and Varoudakis (1996) concluded that educational development is 
a pre-condition for growth, while financial development may become a particularly 
severe obstacle to growth in countries where this pre-condition is satisfied (pp.89) 
 
In general, historical experiences have shown that financial development had begun 
from simple lending and borrowing arrangements to a system of commercial banking 
and non-banking financial institutions as well as well-functioning money and capital 
markets. Although the role of capital market is insignificant largely due to uncertainty 
and information problem in developing countries, the banking system has played a 
significant role in channeling investment funds. The observed correlation between 
financial sophistication and economic growth suggests that financial markets and 
institutions played a significant role in the economic development of countries. 
 
2.2 Financial Repression 
 
Mckinnon (1973) defined financial repression as: 
Bank credit remains a financial appendage of certain enclaves: exclusively 
licensed import activities, specialized large-scale mineral exports, highly 
protected manufacturing, large international corporations, and various 
government agencies, such as coffee marketing boards or publicly controlled 
utilities. Even ordinary government deficits on current account frequently 
limited lending resources of deposit banks. Financing of the rest of the economy 
must be met from meager resources of moneylenders, pawnbrokers, and 
cooperatives (Mckinnon, 1973: 68-69). 
 
In an economy where bank credits are rationed and capital markets are underdeveloped 
or very small, the success or existence of firms depends on access to bank loans. For 
countries, which adopted export promotion strategy, exporters may find it difficult to 
establish themselves in new international markets and to produce and market new 
products by learning and acquiring foreign technology at the early stage of the strategy. 
Due to this risk, the rate of return on investment in export-oriented industries can be less 
than similar investment for domestic market if all other factors remain constant. To 
solve this problem, governments in such countries involve in providing low interest rate 
credit, foreign loan guarantees, direct subsidy, and other trade policies. 
 
According to Shea (1994) the allocations of investment funds in Taiwan has not been 
completely satisfactory from efficiency point of view. He argues that although the 
financial system in Taiwan has a good record of stimulating and mobilizing domestic 
savings, the performance of financial institutions in allocating fund has often been 
criticized. The criticisms include that collateral was emphasized rather than the 
profitability or productivity of borrowers and consumption finance was purposely 
neglected. He emphasized that those public enterprises and large firms, which 
contributed small portion to value added, had received disproportionately large credit 
from formal financial institutions, while small and medium enterprises which 
contributed the greater proportion to the value added obtained credit from curb market 
in the 1980s. Therefore, he concludes that in the 1950s and early 1960s, the Taiwan 
economy was short of investment funds; the private sector lacked experienced 
entrepreneurs; and industries with comparative advantage could be easily identified. 
Under such circumstances, a strategy to depend on selective credit control policies 
rather than interest rate mechanism to allocate investment funds might not cause much 
harm. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, when Taiwan’s economy had more investment 
funds and entrepreneurs and industries with comparative advantage were no longer 
easily identifiable, the government’s dependency on such policies naturally invited 
distortions and criticism (Shea, 1994).  
 
Similarly, Nam (1992) argues that the credit share for heavy and chemical industries of 
Korea rose from 27% in 1975 to 31% in 1980, but dropped to 26% during 1984-85 
before it stabilized thereafter at a 27-28% level, strongly suggests inefficiency of 
government-directed resource allocation in the latter half of the 1980s. Even though the 
variation in the HCI share of bank loans may not look large, they are really significant 
given that the HCI's share of GDP has risen substantially (from 12.0% in 1975 to 17.2% 
in 1985, for instance) (Nam, 1992:22). 
 
In general, according to Sikorski inefficiencies under financial repression became 
apparent in: 
1. Resource Mobilization. The policies of low, and often negative, real interest rates 
provided no incentives to savers, creating a current biased towards consumption 
and reducing savings to sub-optimal levels. The problem will increase the reliance 
of financial institutions on the government and create additional demand-pull 
inflationary pressure. 
2. Credit allocation. The portfolio restrictions placed on banks meant credit was 
allocated on the basis of political and non-economic rationale. The elastic supply of 
subsidized credit to firms favored by government policy meant firms lacked a 
discipline to use credit efficiently or effectively and led to misuse of resources. 
Inefficient investments were also feasible at below market interest rates and were 
undertaken at the expense of projects within firms being credit rationed. 
3. Banking activity. The large amount of government intervention in the financial 
markets increased the reliance of banks on policy direction. Banks were not 
required acquiring loan appraisal skills as they often relied on government loan 
guarantees in extending credit. Problems of asymmetric information were not 
effectively surmounted and banks were left with portfolios that were severely 
weakened by non-performing loans (Sikorski 1996: 65-66).    
 
2.3 Financial Liberalization 
 
Until the early 1970s, in accordance with the Keynesian and neoclassical theories, it 
was assumed that low interest rates would promote investment and economic growth. 
Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) provided theoretical and empirical evidences about 
the cause of financial liberalization in the developing countries in the early 1970s. Since 
the debt crisis of 1982 and rapid voluntary capital inflow restriction to the developing 
countries, the financial liberalization models became the main theoretical foundation 
behind the policies advocated by the IMF and the World Bank. It is now a conventional 
wisdom that financial liberalization is a means to stimulate growth. 
 
2.3.1 The Effect of Financial Liberalization on Savings 
Mobilization 
  
The assumption behind liberalization is that low interest rates under regulated financial 
system do not stimulate savings. The prior-saving argument presented in the financial 
liberalization models, assumed to maintain that internal saving can be increased by 
stimulating savings with positive interest rates and by enhancing competition between 
financial institutions through financial deregulation.  
 
Morisset (1991) reports that the deregulation of interest rates in Argentina in 1977 
resulted in a further increase in the real interest rate for deposits and thus there was a 
dramatic increase of savings through banking system. However, an increase in real rates 
of interest involved a portfolio shift from capital goods and foreign assets into monetary 
domestic assets in Argentina (Morisset, 1991:15). Therefore, the policy of financial 
liberalization does not always lead to increase in the investment funds and thus private 
investment in capital goods in developing countries. The empirical results of Morisset 
show that the negative effect is higher than the positive effect in Argentina between 
1961 and 1982.  Thus, the study concludes that the total effect of financial 
liberalization is negative on private investment. Gupta and Lensink (1996) describe that 
if the government finances its budget deficit by borrowing from the banking sector, it is 
a priori not possible to predict the effect of financial liberalization on the supply of 
credit to the private sectors (pp.21). However, financial reforms in various East Asian 
countries have been rated more successful, but common denominator to this success 
appears to be a very gradual and cautious approach towards financial liberalization 
(Gupta, 1997: 101).  
 
In addition to the drastic increase in the interest rate, financial dualism will also be 
assumed as the result of financial liberalization. Medium and small sized firms, which 
are rationed from official credit markets, rely on curb market and retained earning form 
of finance to satisfy their financial requirements. Large and export industries, which are 
favored under financial repression, are highly dependent on bank credit. Therefore, a 
change in the price of that credit will have a large burden on their behavior. Sikorski 
(1996) noted that the large increase in credit requirements of the priority firms, 
combined with the reduction in the credit-creating capability of the state banks, rapidly 
led to financial problems in Indonesia. 
 
Thus, according to Sikorski (1996) the broad consensus amongst the proponents of 
liberalization appears to be the liberalization of interest rates is possible and desirable, 
given (i) a stable macroeconomic environment devoid of fiscal imbalance, (ii) a 
competitive financial market functioning in relative autarky with active money, bond 
and equity markets, (iii) the absence of information deficiencies; and (iv) prudent 
supervisory and regulatory frame works able to discourage excessive risk taking by 
financial institutions (Sikorski, 1996:112) 
 
2.3.2 Allocative Efficiency of Financial Liberalization  
 
High interest rate due to liberalization is not only increases quantity of investment funds 
and, therefore, investment but also it improves the quality of investment. Sikorski 
(1996) demonstrates that under financial repression, it was assumed that inefficient and 
low yielding investments could be undertaken due to effective subsidy granted to them 
by low nominal interest rates. Financing such investments implies that higher yielding 
investment projects are crowded out of the official credit markets, and are thus often not 
undertaken. A policy which eliminated the subsidy, by raising nominal interest rates, 
was advocated in order to ration out the lower yielding investments and improving the 
allocation of resources in the financial system (Sikorski, 1996:75). 
 
Although the financial system intermediates only part of the investible resources, it 
plays a vital role in allocating saving. According to the World Bank (1989), in the early 
stages of development, relatives, friends, and moneylenders may be the only source of 
external finance. As the financial system grows, local banks, the national financial 
institutions, and finally securities markets and foreign banks become source of funds for 
investors (World Bank, 1989:29). Sikorski  (1996) describes that Kapur (1976) presents 
a model that illustrates the primary relation in liberalization theory that an increase in 
interest rates is growth enhancing because it increases the quantity of investment funds 
and, therefore, investment (Sikorski, 1996:69). The rationale behind this argument is 
that higher interest rates due to liberalization increase the level of savings, thus 
expanding the banking sector and hence causing an increase in the quantity of 
investment. Thus, financial liberalization, characterized by interest rate deregulation, 
increases both quantity and quality of investment and thereby improves allocative 
efficiency.  
 
But the improvement in the allocative efficiency, which is induced by financial 
liberalization, is difficult to measure. Some authors such as Stinglitz(1991) and as cited 
in the literature of Gupta and Lensink(1996) Galbis(1977) and Cho(1986 &1988) 
questioned the validity of financial liberalization causes improvement in the allocative 
efficiency. However, their models to measure the allocative efficiency were subjected to 
criticism due to measurement problems and data limitations. For example, according to 
Gupta and Lensink (1996) Galbis did not explicitly consider the role of informal credit 
markets, which evidently is an important element in their analysis. For South Korea, 
Cho (1988) used marginal cost as a proxy for marginal return for 68 profit maximizing 
manufacturing industries due to data limitation for marginal rate of returns. He 
compared the variances of borrowing costs before and after liberalization and found that 
the variance was significantly reduced since 1981 compared to the 1970s. He concluded 
that a reduction in the variance of average cost (as proxy of marginal cost) across 
sectors signifies an improvement in the efficiency of credit allocation. 
 
Gupta and Lensink have noted that Capoglu (n.d.) also tested the variance of the 
borrowing costs in Turkey. But he concluded that the variance was lower in 1982 than 
1987, thus suggesting that financial liberalization did not results in increased efficiency 
of credit allocation. However, according to Gupta and Lensink these studies have been 
criticized on the grounds that the reduction in variance does not necessarily an 
improvement in the allocative efficiency because such reduction is easily induced by 
state intervention, requiring lending institutions to allocate credit to favored sectors at 
uniform rates (ibid). Nam (1992) also cited that Amsden and Euh (1990) argued that a 
smaller variance of borrowing costs across different industries is not necessarily good 
indicative of greater allocative efficiency. The more highly developed the industrial 
sector, they maintain, the fewer the number of new industries requiring special 
treatment (preferential loans). Basically, the reduced inter-industry variance of 
borrowing costs is viewed as a result of industrialization, and not necessarily input into 
it (Nam, 1992: 31).        
 
Gupta and Lensik (1996) describe that a deregulation does not always guarantee an 
improvement in overall productivity and thus growth. The outcome depends on how 
two sectors (advanced & backward) react towards the formal and the informal banking 
sectors as lenders and borrowers, which ultimately affects the portfolio behavior of the 
two sectors and consequently allocational efficiency. They conclude that in the absence 
of informal banking sector, interest rate deregulation always leads to an improvement in 
the allocative efficiency (Gupta and Lensink, 1996). 
 
2.3.3 Operational Efficiency of the Banking Sector 
 
In addition to the effects of interest rate deregulation due to financial liberalization, it is 
also possible to examine the reduction of cost of financial intermediation. The cost of 
financial intermediation measures the operational efficiency of banking sector. One way 
to measure banking efficiency is to examine the spread between the deposit and lending 
rate. The functional efficiency of the banking system is influenced by several factors 
such as efficiency in technology and productivity of employees. Under repressed 
financial system, in which government fixes the deposit and lending rates, operational 
efficiency of banks remains low. Financial liberalization leads to an increase in both the 
effective deposit and lending rates, whereas an improvement in banking efficiency leads 
to an increase in the effective deposit rate and a decrease in the effective lending rate 
(Gupta &Lensink, 1996:89). 
 
Financial liberalization leads to higher operational efficiency in the long run because of 
increasing deregulation, which promotes competition. According to the World Bank 
(1989), in practice, competition will limit the amount by which the spread between 
deposit and lending rates can be enlarged. Banks that set lending rates too high or 
deposit rates too low eventually lose business to competitors (World Bank, 1989:79). 
 
Gupta and Lensink (1996) emphasized that in contrast to financial liberalization in the 
sense of an increase in the deposit and lending rate, an increase in the banking 
efficiency increases the private sector’s disposable income and decreases the cost of 
capital (pp.94). However, they argue that an increase in banking efficiency on private 
investment is ambiguous both for the case where the private sector is credit constrained 
and for the case where it is not credit constrained. For both cases, the analysis suggests 
that the effectiveness of an improvement in banking efficiency on private investment is 
greater the lower the degree of substitutability between bank deposits and capital in the 
private’s portfolio and the greater the sensitivity of private investments to changes in 
income and wealth, assuming that wealth increases due to an improvement in banking 
efficiency.  
 
Bank's operational efficiency is measured by the interest rate margin. Sikorski (1996) 
describes that interest rate margins eventually declined as competition began to 
increase and non-performing loans took their toll. The volatility of interest rates after 
the reform also forced the banking industry to adjust its lending terms to minimize 
interest rate risk in Indonesia (Sikorski 1996:221). He also argues that the impact on 
the profitability of banks was predictably adverse, declining after the reform for all 
categories of banks. Profit to total asset ratios for all banks in Indonesia declined from 
2.7% in 1982 to 1.8% in 1985, mainly as a result of a sharp decline in loan portfolio 
performance and rise in funding costs (cho and Khatkhate, 1989 in Sikorski 1996:221) 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE ETHIOPIAN ECONOMY 
 
3.1 The Historical Background of Economic Policies 
 
Ethiopia is the poorest country in GNP per capita terms as in the most recent World 
Bank reports. The last decades are observed to be poor in the overall economic 
performance and no change in the structure of the economy. In 1974, it was found that 
the main problem for the underdevelopment of the country was the economic policy 
adopted by the feudo-bourgeois regime. Thus, the next regime pursued a policy of 
rapid economic growth with equal distribution of income under the socialist ideology. 
However, after seventeen years, the living standard of the society was much worse off 
than the regime before. Therefore, the new government adopted market-oriented 
economic policy after the overthrow of the socialist regime in 1991. The strategy of the 
current government is Agriculture Development Led Industrialization (ADLI). It is 
believed that the agricultural sector is the driving force for the rest of the economy in 
the strategy.  
 In the financial sector, the monetary and credit policies of the government were 
designed to ensure the growth of monetary aggregates consistent with the growth of 
GDP and inflation targets. The strategy also wishes to establish a modern competitive 
financial system. The monetary and financial policies of the previous government were 
directed towards the fulfillment of the annual plans. Therefore, financial institutions 
were made to provide credit to inefficient public enterprises and state-owned farms at 
preferential interest rates. Hence, very little amount of financial resources was 
available to the more efficient private sector.  
 
Thus, the new government issued monetary and banking proclamations in January 1994. 
The proclamation gave the National bank of Ethiopia (NBE) increased autonomy to 
supervise the banking system. It also allowed the private sector to participate in the 
banking and insurance businesses. Furthermore, the agricultural and industrial bank was 
restructured and renamed as Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) while the Housing 
and Saving Bank was also restructured and renamed as Construction and Business Bank 
(CBB) in 1995. The state owned financial institutions were re-capitalized. A 
proclamation for the establishment of micro-financing institutions was issued on July 5, 
1996. Treasury Bills of different maturities were introduced in1996/97. Although 
minimum interest rate was set for saving, the lending rate was deregulated in January  
1998. 
 
3.2 The structure of Ethiopian Economy 
 
It is not only the structure of the economy that did not change, but also the overall 
economic performance of the country was very poor during the previous regime (1974-
91). GDP growth by industrial origin at 1980/81 constant factor cost which averaged 4% 
per annum during the period 1965-1973, fell to about 1.5% per annum during the period 
spanning 1974 to 1991(Survey of Ethiopian Economy, 1999:36). The economy was even 
worse in the later periods of the last regime. As shown in the table 1, the average real 
GDP growth rate for the last eight years (1983/84-1990/91) of the previous regime was 
only 1% per year, compared with average population growth rate of 3% per annum, 
leading to a net decline in per capita income of about 2% per year. If we exclude the 
abnormal year 1990/91 as politically instable, average annual GDP growth rate can 
improve to 1.8 % while per capita income will decline by 1.2% per year. 
 
The decline in the overall performance of the economy drastically was reflected in 
almost all sectors during the previous regime. The agricultural production, accounting 
for 51% of GDP, grew by only 1.3% on average during the last eight years of the 
previous regime. On average the industrial sector declined by 0.2%, distributive 
services (trade, hotels, restaurants, transport and communication) declined by 1.6%, and 
other services (banking and insurance, real estate, education, health, public 
administration, defense and others) grew by 3.6 %. The growth of public administration 
and defense were the major contributors of this growth. 
 
 
 
Table 1: The contribution of Sectors to GDP and other major economic indicators.  
Year Growt
h rate 
of 
GDP 
(%) 
AGRICULTURE 
 
INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTIVE
SERVICE 
OTHER 
SERVICE 
Rate of 
inflation 
(%) 
(CPI) 
Exchang
e 
Rate(Bir
r/US$) 
  As % 
 Of GDP 
Growth 
Rate  
As % 
of 
GDP 
Growt
h rate
As % 
of 
GDP 
Growt
h rate
As % 
of 
GDP 
Growt
h rate 
 
1983/84 -6.3 53.3 -12.5 12.7 6.0 14.4 0.3 19.6 0.8 -0.5 2.07 
1984/85 -9.7 46.7 -20.9 14.7 4.3 16.1 0.9 22.5 3.8 18.4 2.07 
1985/86 9.9 49.3 16.0 14.3 6.6 15.1 3.4 21.3 3.9 4.6 2.07 
1986/87 14.1 51.3 18.8 13.5 8.0 15.3 15.0 19.9 6.6 -9.5 2.07 
1987/88 -0.01 49.9 -2.8 13.0 -3.8 15.8 3.4 21.3 7.1 2.2 2.07 
1988/89 0.4 50.3 1.0 12.1 -6.6 14.9 -5.5 22.8 7.3 9.6 2.07 
1989/90 4.1 50.9 5.3 11.1 -4.7 14.9 4.4 23.2 5.7 5.2 2.07 
1990/91 -4.3 55.9 5.2 9.4 -11.2 11.9 -23.5 22.8 -5.8 20.9 2.07 
1991/92 -3.7 56.5 -2.7 9.0 -7.1 12.1 -2.5 22.4 -5.2 21.0 2.07 
1992/93 12.0 53.5 6.1 10.4 28.5 13.2 22.2 23.0 14.8 10.0 4.27 
1993/94 1.7 50.7 -3.7 10.9 7.0 13.8 6.2 24.7 9.2 1.7 5.80 
1994/95 5.4 49.7 3.4 11.2 8.1 13.9 6.4 25.2 7.7 13.4 6.25 
1995/96 10.6 51.5 18.6 10.6 5.4 13.7 9.0 24.1 5.9 0.9 6.32 
1996/97 5.2 50.7 3.4 10.8 6.8 14.0 7.7 24.5 6.7 -6.2 6.51 
1997/98 -0.5 45.7 -10.3 11.6 6.3 14.8 5.3 27.9 13.3 2.3 6.88 
1998/99 6.3 44.8 4.2 11.7 7.6 14.8 5.9 28.7 9.4  7.51 
 
Source: NBE 
Note: GDP growth rate at 1980/81 constant factor cost  
 
An improvement in economic performance of Ethiopia has been registered since the 
introduction of Economic Reform Program in 1992/93. Real GDP by industrial origin 
grew by an average rate of about 5.8% per annum during the period 1992/93 to 1998/99. 
Growth during this period has come from a strong revival in the industrial sector grew 
at an average of 10.0% per annum, while the distributive service grew at an average of 
9.0% and other services sector at 9.6% per annum after the reform. The agricultural 
sector, accounting for 50% of GDP on average, grew at an average of 3.1% per year 
during the same period. Due to dependence on nature, the agricultural production was 
negative in the two bad weather years after the reform. One of the major factors for the 
underdevelopment of the country is the structure of the economy that is dominated by 
agriculture. It is impressive to notice that the overall economic growth is highest when 
the growth in agricultural sector is highest and vice versa. 
 
Historically, Ethiopia is relatively low inflation country compared to other countries. 
Some of the reasons behind this stability may be the degree of monetization of the 
economy, the nature of policies such as price regulation before the reform and 
conservative monetary and fiscal policies after the reform and performance of the 
agricultural sector after the reform. Fixed exchange rate system for nearly two decades 
until the reform had been contributed to the poor performance of the economy. 
Beginning by devaluation of the currency (Birr) gradually followed by introduction of 
auction based exchange rate system, leading to foreign exchange market stability after 
the reform. 
 
                               3.3 Brief History of Financial Institutions 
 
The banking system has a long history in Ethiopia.  However, the modern banking 
system was begun in 1905 with the establishment of the Bank of Abyssinia based on a 
50 years agreement with the Anglo-Egyptian National Bank. In 1931, the Ethiopian 
government purchased the Abyssinian Bank and renamed it as the Bank of Ethiopia, the 
first nationally owned bank in African content (Belay (1990) and Beforekadu (1995) in 
Alemayehu, 1999:135).  
 
During the five-years of Italian occupation (1936-41), the banking activity continued to 
expand and six banks with total of 37 branches were under operation. In 1942, ‘The 
State Bank of Ethiopia’ was re-established by the Imperial Charter. The state bank 
combined together the functions of central bank and commercial bank. The commercial 
bank of Ethiopia was separated from the National Bank of Ethiopia after re-
establishment in 1963.  After the separation of the two banks, many other banks were 
established. 
        Table 2: Banks in operation before the 1974 Revolution 
Years of 
Establishme
nt  
Name of the banks Number of 
Branches 
Capital at the date 
of establishment 
 (in Million Birr) 
Note dated Banco di Napoli 1 2.0 
1963 Imperial saving and Home ownership 
Public Association 
1 0.6 
1963 National Bank of Ethiopia 4 10.0 
1963 Commercial Bank of Ethiopia 65 35.0 
1963 Addis Bank Share Co. 26 5.0 
1964 Ethiopian Saving and Mortgage S.Co.  2 3.0 
1994 Ethiopian Investment Corporation S.C 1 20.0 
1966 Banco di Roma (Ethiopia) S.C. 8 4.0 
1969 Agricultural and industrial 
Development Bank  
5 100.0 
Total   113  
Source: Alemayehu (1999:137) 
 
All private owned financial institutions including three commercial banks, thirteen 
insurance companies and two non-bank financial intermediaries were nationalized on 
January 1, 1975. The Agricultural Bank of Ethiopia, established in 1945, was re-
established as Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank of Ethiopia (AIDB) in 1969 
and again renamed as Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) since 1994. After 
nationalization, the AIDB specialized in extending medium- and long-term loans to 
agriculture and industry. Housing and saving Bank renamed recently as Construction 
and Business Bank (CBB) was also specialized bank under the socialist regime. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND POLICIES BEFORE AND AFTER 
THE ECONOMIC REFORM 
 
Monetary and financial policies directly or indirectly influence the macroeconomic 
performance of an economy. Thus, one of the core objectives of the economic reform 
program launched since 1992/93 was stabilization of the macro-economy and creation 
of efficient financial system, which facilitates rapid economic development. The reform 
program requires many changes in the activity of banking system. In this process the 
government adopted a strategy of gradualism and strengthening domestic 
competitiveness before full liberalization of the financial system. 
 
In this study, due attention is paid to compare and contrast the performance of financial 
system before and after the economic reform.  The activities of formal and informal 
financial institutions are reviewed in the first section of this chapter. In the remaining 
sections, the development of monetary aggregates, saving and domestic resource 
mobilization, allocative and operational efficiency of the banking system have been 
given special attention. 
 
 
 
4.1 Over view of the financial system 
 
4.1.1 The Formal Financial institutions 
 
The existence of a dual financial system has a historical background essentially in 
developing countries. The formal financial market is composed of monetary institutions, 
other financial institutions, and money and capital markets, which are directed by rules 
and regulations. The informal financial market is operating various underground 
activities without any rules and regulations of the central bank. The formal monetary 
institutions (banks) create credit money while other formal financial institutions like 
insurance companies cannot create money, but they can mobilize idle funds to finance 
investments. 
 
There are four kinds of financial sources for the business sector, namely, financial 
institutions, the curve market (informal market), the money market and the capital 
market. The money and capital markets are underdeveloped in Ethiopia. The financial 
instrument that can be transacted in the capital market is only the government bond. 
Under the money market, only Treasury Bills are operating on bi-weekly auction basis 
since January 1994/95. Auctioning government securities to the public and financial 
institution as well as private enterprises has three maturity periods (28,91 and 182 
days) on the market. T-Bill is used to avoid crowding out effect of government 
borrowing from the banking system, by laying the foundation for the development of the 
market in the country. 
 
Table 3: Financial market 
     Million Birr 
 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 
T-Bills Demanded (total) 6669.1 6639.6 6025.6 12945.5 
T-Bills Sold 4526.0 5017.2 5090.7 11734.2 
Average weighted Yield  4.9 3.9 3.7 3.8 
T-Bills outstanding 1266.0 812.4 681.9 2420.0 
Banks 781.4 43.0 125.0 694.0 
Non-Banks 484.6 769.4 556.9 1726.0 
 
Source: NBE, fourth quarter 1998/99, vol. 14, No.4 
 
 
Various developments were observed in the T-bills market since the beginning of its 
operation. The total demanded for T-Bills reached Birr 13 billion in 1998/99 from Birr 
6.7 billion in 1995/96. The amount of T-bills sold also rose from Birr 4.5 billion in 
1995/96 to Birr 11.7 billion in 1998/99. The weighted average annualized interest rate 
was only 4.9% in 1995/96 much lower than the nominal 10-11% deposit rate of banks in 
the same year. The rate was also much lower than the nominal 6% deposit rate in 
1998/99. 
 
The financial institutions are the most important financial sources for the business 
sector. The number of units for each type of financial institution can be observed in the 
table below. 
 
 
Table 4: Financial Institutions 
  
1991/92
 
1995/96
 
1996/97
 
1997/98
 
1998/99 
March 
31,2000 
Number of 
commercial Banks 
1 5 6 6 8 n.a 
- Private banks 
 
0 4 5 5 7 n.a 
-  Number of 
Branches 
152 202 220 227 246 n.a 
Number of 
Development banks    
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Number of Branches 16 32 32 32 32 32 
Number of 
Construction and 
Business Bank 
1 n.a n.a n.a n.a 1 
- Number of 
Branches 
 
13 
 
n.a 
 
n.a 
 
n.a 
 
n.a 
 
20 
Number of micro-
financial Institutions 
 
- 
 
- 
 
2 
 
5 
 
9 
 
n.a 
Number of Insurance 
Companies  
 
1 
 
7 
 
8 
 
8 
 
9 
 
n.a 
- Private Ins. 
Companies  
 
 
 
0 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
 
7 
 
 
8 
 
 
n.a 
-Number of Branches n.a 50 57 64 79 n.a 
Source NBE: 
n.a = data not available. 
 
 
There were three commercial banks during Imperial regime, which were nationalized on 
January 1,1975 and named as CBE. The commercial bank is the largest in the number of 
branches. After the reform, the number of commercial banks and their branches were 
increasing due to the establishment of private banks (see table 5).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
     Table 5: Private banks 
Bank Number of 
Branches(as of 
Oct.30,1999) 
Date of 
establishment 
Initial Capital (paid 
up) (In million Birr) 
Awash 
International 
Bank 
17 10/10/94 24.2 
Dashen Bank 16 20/09/95 14.9 
Bank of 
Abyssinia 
7 15/02/96 18.8 
Wegagen Bank 17 30/04/97 30.0 
United Bank 6 01/09/98 20.8 
Nib International 
Bank 
2 26/05/99 n.a 
Source: NBE and Alemayehu Geda (1999:140) 
 
The Development bank was providing short-term credit for fertilizers, seeds, etc and 
long term loans for investment in industry and agriculture. It was also providing medium 
and long-term loans for state enterprises, especially for state farms. The construction 
and business bank (CBB) was providing loans for residential and commercial 
constructions. Since CBB was accepting deposits for short term (one-year deposits) 
and lending for long term, it had been faced shortage of loanable funds. It was 
mobilizing time deposits and accepting the deposits of Ethiopian Insurance Corporation 
and Pension and Social Security Authority by the order of government before the 
reform. As far as insurance companies are concerned, there were thirteen private 
insurance companies that were nationalized in January 1975 and merged together to 
form the Ethiopian Insurance corporation. However, after the reform new private 
insurance companies were established. The eight private insurance companies are 
Nyala Insurance, Nile Insurance, Africa Insurance, National Insurance, Awash Insurance, 
United Insurance, Lion Insurance, and Global Insurance. 
 
4.1.2 Informal Financial Initiations 
 
Informal financial Institutions are operating outside the rules and regulations of central 
bank. Since the private sector was restricted to obtain credit from the formal financial 
institution during the previous government, informal financial market was the only way 
to fill the gap. However, the interest rate in this market is much higher than the formal 
institution. A recent survey by minister of Labor and Social Affairs in 1997 on 
agricultural employment and rural non-farm employment in Ethiopia found the interest 
payment as in the table below. 
Table 6: Average interest rate paid per annum (%) 
Lender Interest rate 
Money-Lenders 31.97 
Friends/relatives 11.25 
NGOs 9.40 
Idri or local Groups 26.65 
Banks 10.25 
Others 32.49 
 
Source: Annual Report on the Ethiopian Economy, 1999/2000, PP. 338. 
 
 
 
According to the report, the interest payment varied from one region to another. For 
example, it ranged from 19.31% in Amhara to 56.7% in Tigray region for the interest 
charged by moneylenders. As cited in the Annual Report on Ethiopian Economy, Mauri 
(1987) was found that interest rate charged by moneylenders varied from 24% to 900% 
per annum. 
 'Idri,' a kind of insurance scheme, is one form of informal finance in Ethiopia. The 
members of 'Idri' make regular contribution periodically and use the funds for 
emergencies such as burial of the dead and medical purposes. 'Idirs' have strong 
relation with banks when they deposit their funds in the banks. 'Iqqub' is Ethiopian name 
for ROSCA (Rotating Saving and credit Association). Members of 'Iqqub' can be the 
same neighborhood or profession, or the same work place or ethnic background. They 
contribute the fund and each member can obtain the money by drawing lots. It has 
chairman and secretary performing every procedure according to the rules and 
regulations that are set by all the members. In 1995, the National Bank of Ethiopia 
estimated that 'Iqqub' mobilized funds at 8-10% GDP. There is other many types of 
informal finance in the country. It requires detailed research to understand the informal 
financial market fully.  
 
It is difficult to measure the volume of financial transactions undertaken by different 
market operators in the informal financial market. The Annual Report on the Ethiopian 
Economy (1999/2000) reported that informal financial transaction was about Birr 7.2 
billion in 1998. The ratio of this estimation to the formal financial institution is about 
41% of the deposit mobilized and 157% of the credit disbursed in that year. Thus, the 
contribution of informal financial institutions should not be neglected in the discussion 
of financial system of Ethiopia. Owing to the shortage of formal financial institutions in 
rural Ethiopia, the informal financial sector play an important role in disbursing loans for 
the majority of population in the country. 
 
4.1.3 Semi-Formal and Formal Micro-finance 
 
SCAs (Savings and Credit Associations) or credit union and Credit Schemes Conducted 
by NGOs are the two main semi-formal finances in Ethiopia. The purpose of SCAs is to 
encourage savings and use the fund to extend loans to the members. In addition to this 
purpose, they are expected to improve the knowledge of their members about the 
importance of banking service. The performance of SCAs is evaluated on the basis of 
number of cooperatives and their members, saving size, reserve and total assets. 
 
Table 7a: Savings and credit cooperatives in Ethiopia; July 1986-June 30, 1998 
Year No. of 
coops 
Growth 
rate (%) 
Membershi
p (No.) 
Growth 
rate 
(%) 
Contributions & 
Savings (million 
Birr) 
Growth 
rate (%) 
1985 218 - 38,166 - 12.97 - 
1986 264 21 56,885 49 22.93 77 
1987 309 17 63,540 12 23.30 2 
1988 371 20 38,366 8 30.85 32 
1989 419 13 98,973 45 50.41 63 
1990 484 16 118,037 19 68.96 47 
1991 495 2 119,799 2 78.77 14 
Average 
Growth 
- 13  19  32 
1992 420 - 108,231 - 87.04 - 
1993 426 1 101,299 (7) 86.11 (1) 
1994 497 17 112,664 11 99.77 16 
1995 522 5 116,619 4 111.17 11 
1996 578 11 129,216 11 124.44 12 
1997 620 7 147,302 14 159.87 28 
1998 670 8 150,468 2 167.06 5 
Average 
Growth 
 7  5  10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7b: Savings and credit cooperatives in Ethiopia; July 1986-June 30, 1998 
 
Year Outstandin
g loans 
(million 
Birr) 
Growth 
rate (%) 
Reserves 
(million 
Birr) 
Growt
h rate 
(%) 
Total 
Assets 
(million 
Birr) 
Growt
h rate 
(%) 
Saving 
per 
membe
r (Birr) 
Growth 
of 
saving 
per 
member 
(%) 
1985 12.56 - 0.88 - 19.24 - 340 - 
1986 23.52 87 1.74 97 29.89 55 403 16 
1987 23.64 0.5 1.68 (4) 30.33 2 367 (9) 
1988 33.38 41 2.15 28 42.05 39 451 23 
1989 52.10 56 2.17 1 69.93 66 509 13 
1990 69.83 34 4.02 85 90.78 30 584 15 
1991 79.92 14 4.50 12 102.17 13 658 13 
Averag
e 
Growth 
 33  31  29  10 
1992 89.20 - 5.10 - 109.76 - 796 - 
1993 87.47 (2) 5.48 8 112.29 2 850 7 
1994 100.39 15 7.40 35 135.37 21 886 4 
1995 93.58 (7) 8.16 10 150.71 11 950 7 
1996 118.88 27 9.39 15 168.61 12 965 2 
1997 148.49 25 10.99 17 196.13 16 1088 13 
1998 155.17 5 15.54 41 207.90 6 1114 2 
Averag
e 
Growth 
 9  18  10  5 
  3       
 
Source: Annual Report an Ethiopian Economy, 1991/2000 
 
SCAs increasing in number, membership, mobilizing saving, outstanding Loans, reserves, 
total assets and saving per person. However, in terms of growth rates, all the indicators 
have shown a decline during the post-reform period compared to the pre-reform period. 
The average annual growth rate in the number of cooperatives, for example, reduced 
from 13% during pre-reform period to 7% during post-reform period. Some of the 
reasons for the faster growth during the pre-reform period are: it was mandatory to 
organize cooperatives; people should form cooperatives for saving in order to get bank 
credit for investment in some constructions like housing; micro-financing by NGOs was 
limited and the only source was SCAs. However, some of the above factors were none 
existent during post-reform period, leading to slow down in the growth rate of all 
indicators. During both period SCAs is criticized regarding the distribution of the 
institutions. It is biased towards urban centers. 
 
 Because of repeated drought, the growth of NGOs and their activities are increasing 
overtime. NGO sponsored schemes were successful in achieving their objectives in 
terms of targeting and selecting the beneficiaries as well as performance and 
sustainability. Most of them use the Grameen Bank type of credit delivery and 
repayment enforcement through group pressure. However, NGOs were criticized that 
they relied heavily on donor funds and they didn't follow the banking system. 
 
As far as the formal micro-financing institutions are concerned, total of Birr 17.3 million 
of which 80% was made available by International Development Association (IDA) and 
20% was contributed by the Development Bank of Ethiopia up to the end of 1997. This 
fund was required to revolve. After the provision of the proclamation issued in 1996 for 
the establishment of micro-financing institutions, seven micro-financing institutions 
were established up to August 1998. Now, it is too early to assess the performance of 
this institution. Future research should pay more attention regarding this institution. 
 
4.1 Development of Monetary Aggregates 
 
The two major determinants of monetary base are the net foreign asset holdings of the 
banking system and the total domestic credit. As shown in the table 8, between 1983/84 
and 1990/91 domestic credit grew at an average of 11.9% per year, a slightly above the 
average rate of growth between 1991/92 and 1998/99 which was 11.5%.  
 
 
Table 8a: Trends in Monetary Aggregates (1983/84 – 1990/91)  
(Million Birr) 
Item 1983/8
4 
1984/8
5 
1985/8
6 
1986/8
7 
1987/8
8 
1988/8
9 
1989/9
0 
1990/9
1 
Ave. 
grow.
Domestic 
credit 
4087.1 4475.4 4839.6 5554.2 6293.7 6790.1 7972.0 8936.7 11.9
-Claims on 
Gov’t (net) 
2287.5 2618.5 2766.9 3206.6 3502.2 3886.8 5027.4 6021.6 15.1
- Claims on 
others* 
1799.6 1856.9 2062.7 2347.6 2791.5 2903.3 2944.6 2915.1 7.3 
Foreign 
Assets(net)
** 
136.3 232.1 579.2 536.4 152.3 203.0 46.5 270.5 73.2
National 
Bank 
21.1 160.1 445.1 409.6 54.0 53.5 (30.4) 140.4  
Commercial 
Bank 
115.2 72.0 134.1 126.8 98.3 149.5 76.9 130.1  
Other 
Items(net) 
839.7 858.5 970.6 1281.9 1207.3 1288.1 1310.3 1248.0  
Broad 
Money  
3383.7 1849.0 4448.2 4808.7 5238.7 5705.0 6708.2 7959.3 13.0
Money (m1) 2379.3 2692.1 3179.6 3563.5 3910.8 4174.4 4990.0 6131.7 14.6
-Demand 
deposits*** 
1096.4 1333.6 1587.7 1820.0 2002.5 1992.6 2253.7 2314.3 11.5
-Currency 1282.9 1358.5 1591.9 1743.5 1908.3 2181.8 2736.3 3817.4 17.3
in 
circulation 
Quasi 
Money 
1004.4 1156.9 1268.6 1245.2 1327.9 1530.6 1718.2 1827.5 7.3 
-Saving 
Deposits 
718.3 814.0 940.3 1054.6 1209.7 1369.0 1576.8 1679.4 12.9
-Time 
Deposits 
286.1 342.9 328.3 190.6 118.2 161.6 141.4 148.1 -5.1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8b: Trends in Monetary Aggregates (1991/92 – 1998/99) 
(Million Birr) 
Item 1991/9
2 
1992/9
3 
1993/9
4 
1994/9
5 
1995/9
6 
1996/9
7 
1997/9
8 
1998/9
9 
Ave. 
grow.
Domestic 
credit 
10105.
9 
12166.
8 
12744.
2 
13873.
4 
15411 17146 18931 21270.
8 
11.5
-Claims on 7033.6 7824.9 9616.1 9024.1 7888 8797 9372 9567.6 6.5 
Gov’t (net)  
- Claims on 
others* 
3072.3 4341.9 3128.1 4849.3 7523 8349 9559 11703.
2 
22.1
Foreign 
Assets(net)
** 
403.1 809.7 3764.6 4658.6 3524.4 5204.4 5434.7 5736.8 74.7
-  National 
Bank 
108.5 159.1 2143.1 2344.5 3610.9 2870.5 2165.5 2521.7  
- 
Commercial 
Bank 
294.6 650.6 1621.5 2314.1 (86.5) 2333.9 3269.2 3215.1  
Other 
Items(net) 
1498.3 2454.5 4910.1 4529.2 3629.4 5744.5 5763.3 8634.2  
Broad 
Money  
9010.7 10522.
0 
11598.
7 
14002.
8 
15306.
0 
16605.
9 
18602.
4 
18373.
4 
11.2
Money (m1) 6845.1 7711.9 8373.2 9909.0 9561.5 10073.
9 
11045.
9 
10345.
7 
7.0 
- Demand 
deposits*** 
2529.5 2826.9 3214.3 4065.7 3869.2 4837.3 6325.8 6182.5 13.8
- Currency 
in 
circulation 
4315.6 4885.0 5158.9 5843.3 5692.3 5236.6 4720.0 4163.2 1.6 
Quasi 
Money 
2165.6 2810.1 3225.5 4093.8 5744.5 6332.0 7556.5 8027.7 20.8
- Saving 
Deposits 
2002.0 2459.5 2844.3 3649.3 4984.0 5685.2 6481.7 7167.4 20.2
- Time 
Deposits 
163.7 350.6 381.2 444.5 760.5 846.7 1074.8 860.3 29.9
Source: NBE, various issues 
* Data from only NBE and CBE. 
** Excludes data from other financial institutions. 
*** Uncleared checks only are netted out from gross demand deposits. 
Much of the growth before the reform was accounted for by credit to the central 
government, growing at an average rate of 15.1% per year mainly to finance budget 
deficit for which it was only 6.5% per annum after the reform. The growth was negative 
in 1994/95 and 1995/96 when the central government had started repayment of its 
loans to the banking system.  
 
 
The domestic credit to the private sector is a major determinant factor for the expansion 
of monetary base in the recent years in contrast to the pre-reform period. Thus, the 
recent average growth of domestic credit on others was three times higher than during 
the pre-reform period. Another important determinant of monetary base is the net 
foreign asset holding of the banking system. The net foreign asset grew at an average of 
74.7% per year during the post-reform period, slightly faster than the pre-reform period 
of 73.2%. The increase in the net foreign asset was mainly due to the recovery in export 
earning, devaluation of the exchange rate, and flow of official development assistance to 
support the reform program. 
 
The broad money (M2), influenced by “other items (net)” which is the balancing item, 
comprises of M1 (narrow money) and quasi money. The average annual growth rate of 
M2 was 13% before the reform since 1983/84, a little faster than the post reform period 
of 11.2%. The M1 grew by an average rate of 14.6% per year during the period 1983/84 
to 1990/91. Both demand deposits and currency in circulation increased during this 
period at average annual growth rate of 11.5% and 17.3% respectively. The share of 
currency in circulation exceeded that of demand deposit during the pre-reform period 
except in 1986/87 and 1987/88. However, because of extreme price control, the 
increase in the currency in circulation did not result in inflationary situation. During the 
post-reform period, the average annual growth rate of M1 was 7%, half the growth 
exhibited during the pre-reform period. Although the average annual growth rate in the 
demand deposits increased from 11.5% during 1983/84 – 1990/91 to 13.8 % during 
1991/92- 1998/99, the growth in the currency in circulation reduced substantially from 
17.3 to 1.6% during the same period. The proportion of currency in circulation in M1 
declined from 63% in 1991/92 to 40% in 1998/99, leaving the ground for the increase in 
the demand deposits from 37% to 60% in the same period. The decline in the volume of 
currency in circulation in both absolute and relative terms indicates the increased cost 
of holding cash in terms of foregone interest earning during the post-reform period. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Structure of Deposit Rates (in % per annum) 
 Through 
Sep.30,1992
Oct.1, 1992-
Aug.31, 1994 
Sep.1,1994-
Jan. 1,1995 
A. time Deposits    
30 days notice - 10.5 10.5 
3 months to less than 6 
months 
- 10.5 10.5 
6 months to less than 12 
months 
- 11.0 11.0 
1 year to less than 2 years Differed by 
ownership 
and maturity
11.5 11.5 
2 Years and above ” 12.0 12.0 
Memorandum Items Rate 
differentials for 1 year and 
over 
• Financial 
Institutions(1Year) 
• Government owned under 
takings (1year). 
 
1.0 
1.0 
 - 
Individuals, Savings and 
credit cooperatives, and 
self-help organizations: 
1year. 
             
6.0 
 - 
                        2 
Years 
6.5  - 
                        3 
Years 
7.0  - 
                        5 
Years 
7.5  - 
Others:1 Year 4.0  - 
            2 Year 4.5  - 
            3 Year 5.0  - 
            5 Year 5.5  - 
B. Saving Deposits Differed by 
ownership 
and maturity
10.0 10.0 
Memorandum Items: 
Rate differentials: 
Individuals, Savings and 
Credit cooperatives, self-
help organizations. 
• Up to Birr 100,000 
 
 
 
             
6.0 
 - 
In excess of Birr 100,000 2.0  - 
Others Not allowed 
to maintain 
savings 
Account 
 - 
 
Minimum 
Interest 
Rates on 
Time and 
savings  
 
Jan.2, 1993-
Nov.30,1995
Dec.1,1995-
May.30,199
6 
June1,199
6-
Sep.15,19
96 
Sep.16, 
1996-
Dec.31, 
1997 
Jan.1, 
1998-
todate 
Deposits 10.0 11.0 10.0 7.0 6.0 
 
 
Source: NBE, Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 14, No 4, Fourth Quarter, 1998/99 
 
This shows the increase in savings or interest bearing assets other than cash in the one 
hand and the fast expansion of the demand deposits reflecting the expansion of 
business activities through written checks instead of cash transfer on the other hand. 
The minimum interest rates on time and saving deposits in different periods are 
summarized in the table above. 
 
During the pre-reform period, interest rates on private sector saving deposits were at the 
level inherited from the Imperial Regime, 6% on deposits up to Birr 100,000 and 2% in 
excess of this amount. Therefore, the growth in saving deposits was only 12.9% 
compared to 20.8% when the interest rate in saving deposits rose to 10% since Oct.1, 
1992. Others such as government organizations, financial institutions, Cooperatives 
other than savings and credit associations, state enterprises, etc. were not allowed to 
maintain saving deposits. However, interest rates on time deposit were revised that 
differed on the basis of source of funds.  
 
4.3 Savings and Domestic Resource Mobilization 
 
4.3.1 Deposit Mobilization 
 
The prevalence of positive real rate of interest and attainment of economic recovery 
after the reform, deposit mobilization expanded at faster rate in the banking system 
when compared to pre-reform period. The three types of deposits (demand, saving and 
time) are mobilized from individuals, private and public business enterprises, financial 
institutions and government.   This analysis excludes deposits from central 
government and concentrates on the mobilization of deposits in terms of financial 
intermediation. Among the three types of deposits, banks usually pay interest rates on 
saving and time deposits, which the interest on the former is less than the latter. 
Although real interest rate was negative, the saving deposits had been increasing before 
the reform mainly due to absence of alternative investment activities.  
Table 10a: Deposit by type (Pre-reform) 
Million Birr 
*Item 1983/8
4 
1984/8
5 
1985/8
6 
1986/8
7 
1987/88 1988/8
9 
1989/9
0 
1990/9
1 
Ave.  
grow
. 
DD 1258 
(48.9) 
1531 
(51.8) 
1695 
(52.0)
2029 
(54.6)
2251 
(55.1) 
2255 
(51.8)
2496 
(51.4) 
2603 
(50.8) 
9.6 
SD 799.6 
(31.1) 
849.5 
(28.7) 
974.5
(29.8)
1085 
(29.2)
1267 
(31.0) 
1433 
(32.9)
1639 
(33.8) 
1753 
(34.2) 
11.9
TD 515 576 592 602 564 667 719 765 6.1 
(20.0) (19.5) (18.2) (16.2) (13.8) (15.3) (14.8) (14.9) 
Total 2572.6 2956.5 3261 3716 4082 4355 4854 5121 10.4
 
Table 10b: Deposit by type (Post-reform) 
        Million Birr 
*Item 1991/9
2 
1992/9
3 
1993/9
4 
1994/9
5 
1995/96 1996/9
7 
1997/9
8 
1998/9
9 
Ave. 
grow
. 
DD 2870 
(50.6) 
3461 
(51.3) 
4211 
(52.7)
5530 
(55) 
6260 
(52.3) 
7343.5
(52.9)
9546.2 
(53.8) 
9076.9
(50.9) 
17.4
SD 2086 
(36.7) 
2577 
(38.2) 
3005 
(37.6)
3868.5
(38.3)
4984.7 
(41.6) 
5687.4
(41) 
6483.7 
(36.6) 
7147 
(40.1) 
19.4
TD 716 
(12.6) 
712 
(10.5) 
776 
(9.7) 
712 
(7) 
731.1 
(6.1) 
847 
(6.1) 
1675.1 
(9.5) 
1611.8
(9) 
13.3
Total 5672 6750 7992 10110.
6 
11975.9 13877.
9 
17705 17835.
7 
17.2
Source: NBE 
*Figures in Brackets are percentage share. 
  DD= demand deposit  
  SD= saving deposit 
  TD= time deposit 
 
The annual average growth rate of total deposits was 10.4% which was attributed 
mainly to the growth in savings deposit of 11.9% on average per annum before the 
reform beginning 1983/84. Although there was no interest earning on demand deposits, 
it was growing by 9.6% per year on average during the pre-reform period. Owing to the 
weak capacity of the economy to save for a long term during both periods and negative 
real rate of interest on resource mobilization before the reform, time deposits were 
growing slower than demand and saving deposits. Its annual average growth rate was 
6.1% before the reform and 13.3% after the reform. Its percentage share in the total 
deposits is also very low during both periods for the same reason. The share of time 
deposit in the total was as high as 20% in 1983/84 and as low as 6.1% in 1995/96 and 
1996/97. The proportion of demand deposits was ranging from 49% to 55% while that 
of savings deposits was from 29% to 42%. The trend in the share of savings deposits 
was increasing particularly after the reform due to positive real rate of interest. 
 
The pre-reform period witnessed higher growth in the annual flow of funds to the 
specialized banks (CBB and DBE). This is because of forced saving by public 
enterprises and non-bank financial institutions that were required to put their deposits 
in specialized banks at the rate of interest far lower than the official deposit rate which 
was only 1%. The main purpose was to finance investment or provides credit to the 
socialized sector and urban housing construction at lower rate of interest.  
 
Thus, the annual average growth rate of deposits of DBE, explained by time deposit 
was 30.2% while that of CBB was 14% before the reform beginning 1983/84 (see table 
11). This is substantially higher than the growth in the deposits of commercial bank, 
which was 9.8% per year on average. Specialized banks were not primarily established 
for the purpose of mobilizing funds on commercial basis but to provide credit for 
priority sectors administratively. The commercial bank, Ethiopia’s dominant baking 
institution especially in terms of deposit mobilization and credit operation, accounted for 
about 88% of total deposits on average before the reform beginning 1983/84 and about 
91% after the reform. Although the growth of deposits in both DBE and CBB was faster 
than CBE before the reform, the share of DBE and CBB in total deposits were very 
small, accounting for 2.8% and 8.9% respectively. 
Table 11a: Deposit by mobilizing Bank (Pre-reform) 
    Million Birr 
Item 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 Average 
growth 
All 2572.6 2956.5 3261.5 3716 4082 4355 4854 5121  
Banks 
CBE 2311 
(89.9) 
2684 
(90.8) 
2978 
(91.3) 
3264 
(87.8) 
3571 
(87.5) 
3777 
(86.7) 
4202 
(86.6) 
4415 
(86.2) 
9.8 
DD 1258 1531 1695 2029 2251 2255 2496 2603 - 
SD 761 813 940 1053 1208 1367 1575 1677 - 
TD 292 340 343 182 112 155 131 135 - 
CBB 213 
(8.3) 
223 
(7.5) 
236 
(7.2) 
320 
(8.6) 
376 
(9.2) 
441 
(10.1) 
469 
(9.7) 
521 
(10.2) 
14.0 
DD - - - - - - - - - 
SD 38 36 34 32 59 66 64 76  
TD 175 187 202 288 317 375 405 445  
DBE 49 
(1.5) 
50 
(1.7) 
48 
(1.5) 
132 
(3.6) 
135 
(3.3) 
137 
(3.1) 
183 
(3.8) 
185 
(3.6) 
30.2 
DD - - - - - - - - - 
SD 06.6 0.5 0.5 - - - - - - 
TD 48 49 47 132 135 137 183 185 - 
PRIVA
TE 
- - - - - - - - - 
DD - - - - - - - - - 
SD - - - - - - - - - 
TD - - - - - - - - - 
 
Table 11b: Deposit by mobilizing Bank (Post-reform) 
 
Item 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 Average 
growth 
All 
Banks 
5672 6750 7992 10111 11976 13878 17705 17835.7  
CBE 5022 
(88.5) 
6228 
(92.3) 
7436 
(93.0) 
9598 
(94.9) 
11194 
(93.4) 
12702 
(91.5) 
15519 
(87.6) 
15017 
(84.2) 
16.9 
DD 2870 3461 4211 5504 6038 7065 9197.5 8579.5  
SD 1999 2451 2844 3649 4585 5090 56231 6000.1  
TD 153 316 381 445 571 547 697.5 437.3  
CBB 485 
(8.6) 
359 
(5.3) 
386 
(4.8) 
393 
(3.9) 
409 
(3.4) 
557 
(4.0) 
568.1 
(3.2) 
554.4 
(3.1) 
2.1 
DD - - - 11 38 37 26.8 39.9  
SD 87 126 161 201 219 261 256 265.3  
TD 396 233 225 181 152 259 285.3 249.2  
DBE 165 
(2.9) 
163 
(2.4) 
170 
(2.1) 
86 
(0.8) 
10 
(0.1) 
38 
(0.3) 
632 
(3.6) 
776.0 
(4.4) 
189.3 
DD - - - - 9.4 36 29.6 15.0  
SD - - - - - 2.1 2 2.1  
TD 165 163 170 86 0.3 0.1 600.4 758.9  
PRIVA
TE 
- - - 34 
(0.3) 
363 
(3.0) 
581 
(4.2) 
986.8 
(5.6) 
1488.4 
(8.3) 
693.8 
DD - - - 15.1 174.7 205.5 292.3 442.5 292.1 
SD - - - 18.5 180.7 334.3 602.6 879.5 272.0 
TD - - - - 7.8 40.9 91.9 166.4 453.4 
 Source: NBE 
Note: figures in the brackets are shares of banks 
 CBE= commercial bank of Ethiopia 
 CBB= construction and business bank  
DBE= development bank of Ethiopia. 
 
Both the share and the growth of total deposits in DBE and CBB were attributed to the 
growth and share in time deposits, essentially due to restriction to maintain saving 
deposits by many organizations and institutions as well as the restriction to hold 
demand deposits during the pre-reform period. The growth of total deposits in CBB 
slowed down from 14% per year on average before the reform to 2.1% after the reform 
attributed mainly to the removal of forced savings. The recent faster growth rate of 
time deposits of DBE from 30.2% before the reform to 189% per year on average after 
the reform was mainly due to positive real interest rate. The annual average share of 
time deposits of the private banks in the total time deposits was 5.4% per year ranging 
from 1.1% in 1995/96 to 10.3% in 1998/99. The increase in both share and growth of 
time deposits in CBE and the decline in CBB was mainly due to the removal of forced 
savings in the specialized banks.   
 Deposit mobilization had gained greater momentum in all banks except CBB after the 
reform as the result of maintenance of real interest rate. The growth rate of total 
deposits increased from 10.4 % per year on average during pre-reform to 17.2 % after 
the reform. This growth is specially characterized by the annual average growth of total 
deposits in the CBE, which rose from 9.8% during pre-reform period to 16.9% during 
post-reform period. 
 
The emergence of private banks since 1994/95 was a new feature in the development 
of financial sector in Ethiopia. The share of deposits in the private banks in the total 
deposits has shown increasing trend with annual average share of 4.3% ranging from 
0.3% in 1994/95 to 8.3% in 1998/99 predominantly associated with the share in saving 
deposits. 
 
The declining trend in the dominance of CBE in terms of share in the deposit 
mobilization is mostly attributed to the increasing share in the private banks. The 
average annual growth rate of deposits in these banks was 693.8% mainly associated 
with the growth in the time deposits. 
 Table 12 reveals the break down of deposit by ownership in the CBE since 1987/ 88. 
The annual average growth rate (5.3%) of demand deposits before the reform since 
1987/88 was attributed to the growth in demand deposits of private and individuals, 
central government, domestic banks and non-residents.  
 
Table 12a: mobilization of deposit by sector, CBE (Pre-reform) 
    Million Birr 
 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 Ave. 
Growth 
(%)  
Demand Deposits - - - - - 
Private and Individuals 393.1 417.4 476.9 528 10.4 
Cooperatives 286.5 282.1 301.6 275.3 -1.2 
Public Ent. and Agencies 935.9 988.3 1131.9 1073.1 5.0 
Central Gov’t 124.5 144.6 163.9 159.9 8.9 
Domestic banks, and 
others 
321.5 253.8 181.3 374.3 18.9 
Foreign bank, their acct. 59.6 44.7 42.7 46.7 -6.6 
Non Residents 99.9 93.4 107.2 128.3 9.2 
Total demand 
Deposits(1)  
2221 2224.3 2505.5 2585.6 5.3 
Total demand 
deposits(2) 
     
% of National total(3) 98.7% 98.6% 100% 99.3%  
Saving Deposits      
Private and Individuals 1190.7 1351.9 1558.6 1661.9 12.6 
Cooperatives 16.1 15 15.9 14.8 -2.4 
Public Ent. & Agencies 1.2 - - - - 
Domestic Banks & other - - - - - 
Total saving deposits 1208 1366.9 1574.5 1676.7 11.7 
% of National Total(3) 95.3% 95.4% 96.1% 95.7% - 
Time Deposits - - - - - 
Private & Individuals 102.3 110 122.4 129.9 - 
Cooperatives 7.1 8.9 7.7 4.2  
Public Ent. & Agencies - - - - - 
Domestic Banks & other  2.4 36.4 0.7 0.7  
Total Time Deposits 111.8 155.3 130.8 134.8 9.1 
% of National Total(3)  19.8% 23.3% 18.2% 17.6% - 
Total Deposits 3540.8 3746.5 4210.8 4397.1 7.5 
 
 
 
Table 12b: mobilization of deposit by sector, CBE (Post-reform) 
         Million Birr 
 1991/9
2 
1992/9
3 
1993/9
4 
1994/9
5 
1995/9
6 
1996/9
7 
Ave. 
Growt
h 
Demand Deposits - - - -   (%) 
Private and Individuals 700 761.6 1082.9 1426.8
3 
1568.6
3 
1568.5
1 
20.9 
Cooperatives 230 207.6 195.65 209.1 243.52 326.34 4.2 
Public Ent. And Agencies 1258 1313.4 1540.5
7 
1908.0
0 
1690.6
6 
2241.4
4 
13.9 
Central Gov’t 235 307.2 443.02 568.90 823.92 798.06 31.9 
Domestic banks, and 
others 
268 312.4 304.51 341.23 471.68 278.84 -4.4 
Foreign bank, their acct. 48 224.7 362.00 646.09 840.47 1315.6
9 
99.6 
Non Residents 106 202.2 244.77 377.65 308.68 353.39 27.0 
Total demand 
Deposits(1)  
2842 3132.6 3811.3
6 
5448.4 5107.0
9 
5578.2
1 
16.7 
Total demand 
deposits(2) 
2887 3357 4173.3
6 
6094.4
9 
5947.5
6 
6893.9  
% of National total(3) 99%  99.1% 98.8% 99.2% 96.7%  
Saving Deposits        
Private and Individuals 1983.8 2229  3611.5
9 
4523.4
6 
5019.8
8 
 
Cooperatives 15.2 17.8  29.82 72.98   
Public Ent. & Agencies - - - -  0.158  
Domestic Banks & other - - - 18.18    
Total saving deposits 1999 2246.8 2844.3 3660.9 4596.4
4 
5106.4
2** 
20.4 
% of National Total(3) 95.8% - 94.64% 95.08% 95.45% 89.5%  
Time Deposits - - - -    
Private & Individuals 148.1 307.4  459.68 466.37 456.24  
Cooperatives 4.2 1.2 - 0.996 1.82 4.26  
Public Ent. & Agencies - - - 7.82 95.02 25.84  
Domestic Banks & other  0.6 0.6 - 0.58 30.04 75.65  
Total Time Deposits 152.9 309.2 381.2 444.5 593.25 562.01 30.6 
% of National Total(3)  21.4% - 49.1% 62.5% 75.8% 64.6%  
Total Deposits 4993.9 5885.1 7375.9 9553.8 11200 12613.
2* 
19.3 
 
Source: Alemayehu Geda,1999, pp. 144  
* Total doesn’t add up. This is attributed to deposits of foreign bank (1315.69) and trust 
funds, external finance (50.87), which are foreign currency balances converted at ruling 
exchange rate of the balance sheet data. In 1996/97 in the demand deposits total includes 
Resident account of 11.64.  
* * Including government deposit of 86.38.  
1. Values after and including 1993 here are given as reported on the balance sheet. The 
demand deposit figures reported in the text of the annual reports are very close to the 
sum which includes foreign banks, their account (probably this is assumed as demand 
deposit). 
2. Is the balance sheet figure plus foreign banks. 
3. The percentages are computed from NBE Annual and Quarterly Reports. There are 
minor differences between the figures given by CBE and NBE about deposits of CBE. 
 
Cooperatives and foreign banks have shown a decline of 1.2% and 6.6% respectively 
during the period. However, the 16.7% annual average growth of demand deposits after 
the reform ending 1996/97 associated with the growth in the demand deposits of private 
and individuals, central governments and non-residents. The substantial growth in the 
demand deposits of foreign banks was mainly due to the devaluation of exchange rate 
that appreciated foreign currency nominated accounts particularly in 1992/93 in the 
commercial bank. The demand deposits of public enterprises and agencies, the 
dominant depositor as a share of total demand deposit, grew at an average rate of 5% 
per year before the reform and 13.9% after the reform. 
 
The growth of total saving deposits in the CBE (11.7% before the reform and 20.4% 
after reform) was associated with the growth of saving deposits of private companies 
and individuals during both periods mainly due restriction to maintain saving deposits by 
other institutions. In the same way the growth of time deposits was essentially 
attributed to the growth of private companies and individuals. The shares of saving and 
time deposits of private companies and individuals in their respective category were 
98.6% and 91.5% in 1987/88 and 98.3% and 81% in 1996/97 respectively. The share of 
total deposits of private enterprises and individuals in the total deposits of CBE was 
52.8% in 1990/91 and 55.9% in 1996/97. This suggests that the private sector is the 
biggest source of funds for the commercial bank of Ethiopia. 
 
The major factors that seem to have contributed to the growth of deposits of 
commercial bank after the reform were: the conducive business environment favoring 
firms and individuals to use checking accounts; keeping the real deposit rate positive 
which would enable savers to gain real return. The absence of other alternative high-
yielding monetary instruments to shift savings in the one hand and the growing inflow of 
foreign currency into the country coupled with further depreciation of the birr exchange 
rate enhanced the equivalent foreign currency denominated demand deposits on the 
other were also contributed. 
 
4.3.2  Trends in saving and Investment 
 
It is widely accepted that the financial system have played a significant role in 
producing the virtuous circle of high saving, investment and out put growth. In poor 
countries like Ethiopia, it requires historically unprecedented level of savings both from 
domestic and foreign sources. It was estimated that Ethiopia is required to ensure a 
saving rate of 16% of GDP to achieve a 10% growth rate of GDP (Annual Report on the 
Ethiopian Economy, 1999/2000:31). However, it has historically very low level of 
savings as a percent of GDP. Policy makers in the Imperial Regime identified traditional 
pattern of consumption as an important impact on savings and designed a policy of 
voluntary private saving in the first two national plans of the Imperial government 
(1957-62) and (1963-67). Still the ceremonious culture of the society with so many 
holidays and extravagant spending on these holidays and other occasions have been 
identified as an important factors to affect savings in Ethiopia. In fact, a very low-
income situation of the society is the serious problem in affecting savings. Gross 
Domestic saving (GDS) as a percent of GDP had reached the highest figure of 13% in 
the last years of the Imperial regime (Berhanu and Seid, 1999:23). 
 
The socialist regime believed in the increase in the GDS by reducing conspicuous 
consumption of the ruling class and the sacrifice it anticipated from the lower classes. 
However, the policy of imposing capital ceiling actually became a serious disincentive 
to the saving class and further encourages conspicuous consumption on the one hand 
and there was monetary deepening on the other hand. Due to price control, increase in 
money supply induced savings as additional money in the hands of individuals were not 
used for keeping real money balances leading to higher savings. There was also no 
alternative investment opportunity that associated with the increase in money supply. 
Therefore, the GDS as percent of GDP was 7.5% per year on average during the pre-
reform period beginning 1983/84, slightly higher than the post reform period of 6.1% 
(see the table below). The percentage before the reform had shown a significant 
fluctuation whereas it was steady and increasing trend during the post-reform period 
indicating that the raising deposit rate contributed a little to encourage savings. 
However, the reduction in the minimum deposit rate reduced the percentage of GDS 
from 9% in 1997/98 to 4.4% in 1998/99. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 13: Gross Domestic Saving (GDS), Gross fixed capital Formation (GFCF),      
               Resource Gap, consumption and total Debt (1983/84-1998/99) 
Year GDS 
as % of 
GDP 
GFCF 
as % 
of 
GDP 
Resou
rce 
GAP 
External 
debt 
as % of 
GDP 
Debt 
service 
ratio 
Public 
consump
tion as % 
of GDP 
Private 
consump
tion 
as % of 
GDP 
Total 
consu
mptio
n 
National 
Saving 
as % of 
GDP(At 
current 
market 
price) 
1983/84 8.1 16.8 -8.7 31.7 16.1 17.3 73.6 91.9 10.9 
1984/85 2.8 10.7 -7.9 33.8 24.8 15.3 81.8 97.1 6.5 
1985/86 8.6 16.4 -7.8 36.1 25.6 15.8 75.6 91.4 13.1 
1986/87 7.6 15.6 -8.0 37.4 37.2 15.7 76.7 92.4 10.3 
1987/88 12.5 20.4 -7.9 41.3 43.5 18.1 69.4 87.5 14.2 
1988/89 8.9 14.4 -5.5 41.2 39.2 19.4 71.7 91.1 11.3 
1989/90 7.9 12.5 -4.6 43.1 58.9 19.2 72.9 92.1 9.9 
1990/91 3.4 10.4 -7.0 39.1 69.9 16.5 80.1 96.6 5.6 
Average 7.5 14.7 -7.2 38.0 39.4 17.2 75.3 92.5 10.2 
1991/92 3.0 9.2 -6.2 31.5 82.5 10.5 86.9 97.4 7.0 
1992/93 5.6 14.2 -8.6 70.4 53 11.2 83.8 95 12.9 
1993/94 5.0 15.2 -10.2 90.8 56.9 11.7 83.8 95.5 11.4 
1994/95 6.7 16.4 -9.7 81.8 36.7 11.6 82.5 94.1 16.4 
1995/96 6.6 19.1 -12.5 71.4 34.5 11.7 82.5 94.2 15.6 
1996/97 8.3 19.1 -10.8 63.9 40.5 12.1 80.7 92.8 15.0 
1997/98 9.0 20.2 -11.2 61.8 15.7 12.4 39.7 94.1 16.8 
1998/99 4.4 17.8 -13.4 - - 7.9 80.8 95.7 9.8 
Average 6.1 16.4 -10.3 67.4 45.7 12.0 82.6 94.6 13.1 
 
Source: MEDaC and NBE Annual bulletin: various issues. 
 
Gross capital formation (GCF) as percent of GDP was 14.7% per year on average during 
the pre-reform period. The percentage rose to 16.4% during the post-reform period. 
The gap between investment and domestic saving (the resource gap) averaging 7.2% 
and 10.3% before and after the reform respectively, requiring foreign saving that came 
in the form of grants and loans from other countries. This is reflected in the Ethiopia’s 
debt burden, which is measured by the country’s external debt as percent of GDP 
increased from 31.5% in 1991/92 to a peak of 91% in 1993/94 with average of 67.4% 
per annum during the post-reform period ending 1997/98. It is substantially higher than 
the ratio in the pre-reform period of 38%. However, the majority of both savings and 
the external debt used to finance military expenditure during the pre-reform period. 
Hence, public consumption as percent of GDP was 17.2% on average before the reform, 
a substantially higher than 12% after the reform. As the result private consumption as a 
percent of GDP increased from 75.3% during pre-reform to 82.6% after reform. 
 National saving as a percent of GDP was 10.2% during the pre-reform period increased 
to 13.1% on average per year during the post-reform period. The increase in the 
national savings is mainly associated with the growing transfer from other countries. In 
absolute terms, without any adjustment in the exchange rate, national savings rose from 
Birr 1.1 billion in 1990/91 to Birr 7.6 billion 1997/98. 
 
        4.4 Credit Allocation 
 
Under socialism, until May 1991, the monetary and financial policies of government 
were directed to fulfil the annual plans. The state farms and cooperatives were not 
required collateral security when loans were granted. The balance sheet of the DBE at 
end of 1991 indicates that its outstanding loan was Birr 3.0 billion of which 80% was 
for the state farms (Annual Report on Ethiopian Economy, 1999/2000:294). Among its 
loans to the state farms and public enterprises about 92% and 38% were non-performing 
at the end of 1991, respectively (ibid).  Keeping the nominal lending rates artificially 
lower than the market clearing was invited the diversion of credit from the most 
efficient investment by the private sector to the inefficient public sector. 
Table 14: Structure of lending rate (by CBE and specialized banks) (%) 
Sector Through 
June 
30,1986 
              July 1, 1986-
Sep.30,1992 
Post reform 
 
  Cooperativ
es 
State Privat
e 
Oct.1, 
1992-
Aug.31, 
1994 
Spt.1,1994-July 
1,1995 
Agriculture 9-10.5 5 6 7 11-12 Lending to all 
sectors:14-15 
Industry, mining, power 
resources 
9.5 6 8 9 13-14 Lending to the 
central 
government:12-13 
Domestic Trade 9.5 6 8 9.5 14-15 National bank 
lending to : 
Transport & 
Communications 
9.5 6 8 8 13-14 CBEs(discount rate) 
10.5 
Export trade 9.5 6 6 6 13-14 Other financial 
institutions 10.5 
Import trade(agricultural 
Inputs) 
8.5 5 6 7 14-15 Inter-bank lending 
10.0 
Import Trade(other) 9.5 6 8 9.5 14-15  
Hotels and tourism 9.5 6 8 9 14-15  
Construction 9.5 6 8 9 11-12  
Housing 1. Purchase 
                  
10 6 
 
6 
 
8 
 
11-12  
                 2. 
Construction 
9 4.5 4.5 7 11-12  
Central government 3-5 - 3-5 - 12-13  
Banks and financial 
institutions 
5-6.5 - 2.5-4 - 10  
Personal loan  10 - - 10 14-15  
 
 Jan.2,1995-
Nov.30, 1995 
Dec.1,1995-
May 30, 
1996 
July 1,1996-
SEP.15,1996
SEP.16,1996
-dec.31,1997 
Jan.1,1998-
todated 
Maximum lending by 
commercial banks & other 
financial institutions, except 
for central gov’t 
15 16 15 10.5 Liberalized 
Central Government 12 12 12 12 12 
 
 
Source: NBE, Quarterly Bulletin, fourth Quarter, 1998 and Annual Report on Ethiopia Economy 1999/2000:288  
 
Since July1, 1986 the previous government reduced lending rate for all categories of 
borrowers with the exception of personal loans and lending to the central government 
which kept at 10% and 3-5 % per year respectively. Regardless of the economic sector 
for which credit was channeled, cooperatives were the most favored borrowers 
followed by public enterprises since July1986. During the post-reform period 
(especially Oct.1992 to Aug.1994) banks were allowed to determine lending rate within 
the given range. Gradually banks were further allowed to determine lending rate to all 
sectors without discrimination among sectors with given maximum (Sep.1, 1994 –
Jan.1995). The rate was deregulated since Jan.1, 1998. 
 
The clients of bank credit other than the central government are classified into three 
broad categories, namely the private sector, government-owned public enterprises, and 
cooperatives. 
 
Table 15a: credit Disbursement by client and Source (Pre-reform)   
Million Birr 
Client 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 Ave. 
Growth 
Public 
Enterpri
se 
694 478.9 454.4 482.4 517.4 454 387.5 207.5 -13.7 
Coopera 76.3 35 60.2 94.2 169 178 139.7 119.8 17.7 
t. 
Private 285 230.3 211.1 172.4 205.4 187.6 204.3 216.5 -3.0 
Total 1055 744.2 725.7 749 891.8 819.6 731.5 543.8 -7.7 
Sources 1055 744.2 725.7 749 891.8 819.6 731.5 543.8 Share 
CBE 643 404.4 361 411.3 438.6 416 337.9 340 53.6 
DBE 363 300.4 345.2 301.4 342.9 330 315.6 156 39.1 
CBB 49.4 39.4 19.5 36.3 110.3 73.6 78 47.9 7.3 
Private 
Banks 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15b: credit Disbursement by client and Source (post-reform)   
Million Birr 
Client 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 Ave. 
Growth 
Public 
Enterpri
se 
229.8 627.8 239.7 216.8 621 379.1 164 185.9 27.3 
Coopera
t. 
74 124.7 99.4 425.4 524.7 494.5 550 933.8 54.6 
Private 247.1 723.8 1411 2695.9 2947.9 3145.3 3867 3077.7 51.4 
Total 550.9 1476.3 1750.1 3338.1 4093.6 4018.9 4581.3 4197.4 38.4 
Sources 550.9 1476.3 1750.1 3338.1 4093.6 4018.9 4581.3 4197.4 Share 
CBE 364.3 1271 1455 2886.8 3436.5 3004.9 2586.2 2501.2 74.6 
DBE 158.4 165 185.2 336.3 447.7 595 1137.7 840.2 16.4 
CBB 28.2 40.4 109.9 115 209.4 179.1 63 33.5 3.7 
Private 
Banks 
- - - - - 240.2 794.2 922.5 15.1 
 
Source: NBE 
 
 Credit to the central government witnessed a substantial growth due to widening 
government budget deficits before the reform. Thus, credit to the non-central 
government (i.e. Private sector, public enterprises, and cooperatives) exhibited 
declining trend at an average annual rate of 7.7% during pre-reform period beginning 
1983/84. This was associated with the decline in the credit to the private sector at 
average annual rate of 3% and the public enterprises at the rate of 13.7% before the 
reform. The falling in the growth rate of private sector was mostly because of the 
restriction of private activity on the one hand, and bureaucratic procedures in the 
financial process such as strict collateral requirement, lengthy paper works and 
regulations on the other hand as well as higher interest rate on loan as the result of 
discrimination. Inspite of the attention paid to public enterprises, their credit intake has 
shown declining tendency mainly due to huge government capital budget allocated to 
them when new investment and expansion of these enterprises were undertaken. Credit 
to cooperatives, however, has shown a steady increase at average annual growth rate 
of 17.7% during the pre-reform period beginning 1983/84. 
 
The reform removed the restriction on the private sector and allowed banks to 
determine their lending rate to all sectors without discrimination. This has been ensured 
though amending the investment code, relaxation of business licensing requirements 
and regulations. These measures have been successful in shifting the flow of financial 
resources to the more efficient sectors. This is evidenced by the change in the 
structure of credit disbursement after the reform. The average annual share of credit to 
the private sector stood from 28% before the reform to 70.4% after the reform while 
that of public enterprises reduced from 57.7% during pre-reform to 17% during the 
post-reform period. This is the result of the on going privatization of public enterprises 
and limited new investment in these enterprises as well as removal of restriction on the 
private sector. Immediately after the reform, the share of private sector rose 
substantially from 49.1% in 1992/93 to 80.6% in 1993/94 while the public enterprises 
drastically dropped from 42.5% to 13.7% during the same period and even dropped 
further to only 3.4% in 1997/98. The share of cooperatives was reduced from 14.3% 
per year on average before the reform to 12.5% after the reform. 
 
The annual average growth rate of total credit has shown increasing trend of 38.4% 
after the reform from the declining trend of 7.7% before the reform. As soon as the 
reform took place, the highest growth was registered in the total credit disbursed at the 
rate of 170% per year on average in 1992/93 which is associated with the growth of 
193% in the private sector 174% in the public enterprises and 69% in the cooperatives. 
 
As far as the source of credit is concerned, with the elimination of discriminatory credit 
to public enterprises through the specialized banks (DBE and CBB), a substantial portion 
of loans after the reform came from CBE accounting for 74.6% on average, rose from 
53.6% before the reform. Hence, the average annual share of credit disbursed by DBE 
and CBB was 39.1% and 7.3% of the total respectively during the pre-reform period 
since 1983/84. The average annual share of these banks, however, reduced to 16.4% 
for the DBE and 3.7% for the CBB after the reform. This was due to a significant 
increase in the share of CBE as the result of abolition of preferential loan to public 
enterprises from the specialized banks.  
 
It is impressive to notice that private banks have gained a greater momentum in 
channeling credit in the recent years. With in four years of their deposit mobilization 
and three years of credit disbursement the share of private banks in the total loan 
disbursement reached 22% by 1998/99. The annual average share for the three years 
was 15.1% much higher than the share in annual average deposit mobilization 
accounting for 4.3% for the four years. 
 
  Table 16 exhibits sectoral disbursement of loans during both periods. The annual 
average rate of decline in the total credit by 7.7% in the above discussion had been 
experienced by the agricultural sector and internal trade, which exhibited the largest 
share and the highest decline during the pre-reform period.  
 
The average annual rate of decline of credit to agriculture was 12% while that of 
international trade was 14.3% which were accounting for 32.8% and 17.6% of total 
volume of credit respectively during 1983/84-1990/91. The industrial sector, domestic 
trade, and housing and construction registered annual average growth rate of 9.5%, 
9.8% and 15.5 in which their shares were 14.7%, 15.8% and 9.4% respectively before 
the reform beginning1983/84. 
 
Table 16a: Loan Disbursement by sectors (Pre-reform)                                              
                                                                                                      
Million Birr 
 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 Ave. 
Growth 
SECTORS 1055.4 744.2 725.7. 749 891.8 819.6 731.5 543.9 -7.7 
Agriculture 331.6 266.6 326.4 272.3 358.4 234.9 222.7. 83.1 -12.0 
Industry 95.8 105.9 82.7 80.3 82 176.8 145.3 117.4 9.5 
Domestic 
Trade 
123.8 81.1 129.9 101.6 93.6 161.6 110.6 145.8 9.8 
Int. Trade 336.6 158.3 92.9 154 132 129 83.3 67.1 -14.3 
Export 85.8 77.8 76.8 49.5 59.8 71.9 57.5 46.3 -11.3 
Import 250.8 80.5 16.1 104.5 72.2 57.1 25.6 20.9 40.4 
Housing 
&Con. 
70.2 59.6 31.1 49.5 139 88.1 95.9 54.1 15.5 
Others 78.1 58.9 45.6 62.2 74.4 38.9 43.9 55.7  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 16b: Loan Disbursement by sectors (Post-reform)                                              
                                                                                                     
Million Birr 
 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 Ave. 
Growth 
SECTORS 550.9 1476.4 1750.1 3338.1 4094 4018.9 4581.3 4197.4 38.4 
Agriculture 119.4 125.1 92.5 461.3 664.4 679.8 830 992.9 63.3 
Industry 112.5 426.7 325.4 271.3 484.5 387.6 680 512.6 42.9 
Domestic 
Trade 
148.9 381.8 741.2 1249.7 1490. 1274.4 1035 1071.4 36.8 
Int. Trade 38.4 273.4 111.5 255.6 614.6 673.9 1030 566.6 52.3 
Export 27.6 127.4 49.3 111.2 255.7 317 215 136.8 67.2 
Import 10.8 146 62.2 144.4 258.9 356.8 815 429.8 181.7 
Housing 
&Con. 
62.1 57.9 123.7 124.8 130.3 194.7 130 128.8 19.5 
Others 58.1 188.4 328.1 948 809.7 808.5 595 925.1  
        Source: National Bank of Ethiopia 
 
The flow of credit to the industrial sector, domestic trade, and housing and construction 
has been gained even greater momentum since 1991/92 with annual average growth 
rate of 42.9%, 36.8% and 19.5% respectively. Credit to the agricultural sector and 
international trade grew at an average rate of 63.3% and 52.3% per year respectively 
from their declining trend during the post-reform period. The proportion of total credit 
extended to the agricultural sector and international trade, however, declined from 
32.8% and 17.6% prior to the reform to 15.5% and 13.4% per annum respectively on 
average after the reform. The annual average share of credit to the industrial sector 
and domestic trade rose from 14.7% and 15.8% during pre-reform period to 15.6% and 
31.1% during post-reform period respectively.  
 
The loans and advances to both government and non-government to deposits were 14% 
per year on average with declining trend during the pre-reform period. The trend was 
reversed with annual average rate of 19% after the reform due to substantial increase 
in the demand for credit. The declining trend before the reform reflects lower lending 
to the private sector and severe foreign exchange constraint.  
 
In general, most of the credit was channeled to the domestic trade (31%) followed by 
the industrial sector (15.6%) after the reform, which was directed to the agricultural 
sector (33%) through interest rate subsidy before the reform. This reflects the diversion 
of credit to the most efficient investment activity in the domestic trade and industrial 
sector after the reform from the inefficient investment in the agricultural sector, 
particularly the state farms that absorbed the majority of the credit disbursed before the 
reform. The reform did not only improve the quality of investment but also it increased 
the quantity of investment demonstrated by the substantial increase in the volume of 
credit disbursed. The amount of total credit disbursed rose from Birr 0.6 billion at the 
beginning of the reform (1991/92) to Birr 4.2 billion in 1998/1999 (by seven fold) in the 
eight years. It is also impressive to notice that the majority of this credit was disbursed 
to the private sector, the most efficient sector, through commercial banks after the 
reform. It is safe to conclude that much of the increased credit came from the funds that 
were rotating in the informal market due to low real deposit rates in the formal financial 
sector during the pre-reform period, keeping the liquidity position remains constant. 
Thus, the financial liberalization in Ethiopia results in improvement in the allocative 
efficiency. 
 
 
 
  
4.5 Operational Efficiency of the banking sector 
 
4.5.1. Interest rate margin 
 
A good measure for the operational efficiency of banking sector is the cost of financial 
intermediation. This is expressed by the spread between the deposit and lending rate. 
Financial liberalization leads to an increase in both the effective deposit and lending 
rate in the short run and an increase in effective deposit rate and a decrease in the 
effective lending rate in the long run due to increased competition. Thus, the long-run 
effect of financial liberalization is an improvement in the operational efficiency of banks. 
Table 17: Interest rate margin 
 Jan.21995
-Nov.1995
Dec.1,199
5-
May.30,19
96 
June 
1,1996-
Sep.15,199
6 
Sep.16,1996
-
Dec.31,1997 
Jan.1, 1998-
Todate 
Maximum lending rate by 
commercial banks and other 
financial institutions, except 
15 16 15 10.5 Liberalized (10.5-
12.0 as 4th 
Quarter of 
for central Gov’t loan 1998/99)  
Central Gov’t loan 12 12 12 12 12 
Minimum Interest rate on 
Time and Savings Deposits 
10 11 10 7 6 
Interest rate margin for non-
central Gov’t loans  
5 5 5 3.5 4.5-6.0 
Interest rate margin for 
central Gov’t loans 
2 1 2 5 6 
Source: organized from table 9 and 14 
 
 
The interest rate margin for non-central government loans began to narrow since sep. 
16,1996 because of substantial reduction in the maximum lending rate. However, it 
started widening since Jan1, 1998 mainly due to the decrease in the deposit rate. The 
margin for loans to the central government was even started widening at a greater rate 
over time. Although the interest rate is not weighted average, there is an indication that 
no improvement in the operation efficiency of banks. It needs further liberalization of 
interest rates. 
 
As we have seen in the above discussions, there were various liberalization efforts in 
the financial sector under the strategy of gradualism and strengthening domestic 
competitiveness before the sector is fully liberalized. However, there are many 
problems with this approach. International financial institutions, the IMF and the World 
Bank, which advocate financial liberalization, are not satisfied with the liberalization 
efforts and hence the IMF has temporarily suspended its support. Although we are 
behind the schedule set in the policy framework for various reasons, this as a whole 
had not led to disagreement. In general, Ethiopia is not in a good shape to compute if 
something is done on the commercial bank for its dominance and allow foreign banks to 
enter. It takes time to privatize the commercial bank and allow entry of foreign banks. 
Even though it is not enough, the improvement in the performance of overall economy 
and the strategy of gradualism and its over overall reform direction need to be 
appreciated and be supported by the IMF and the World Bank. 
 
4.5.2 Bank profitability 
 
The structure of income and expenses has undergone a substantial change in the last 
few years. Table 18 shows the consolidated profit and loss accounts of banks since 
1989/90. Net interest income (interest income minus interest expense) and non-interest 
income minus tax gives ‘net income after tax’. Non interest income comprises of 
service charges and commission income and other income. Total non-interest expenses 
include employee’s salary and general expenses.  
  Table 18: Trend in the profitability of banks (000 Birr) 
 
Year* 
 
Banks*** 
Net Income 
after tax 
Total Non 
Interest 
Expenses 
 
Net 
Profit/Loss 
Net Profit/loss  
per Loan 
 CBE 125903 88376 37527 111.1 
1989/90 DBE 79614 146032 -66418 -210.4 
 CBB 13578 8585 4993 64.0 
 PRIVATE - - -  
 ALL BANKS 219095 242993 -23898 -35.3 
1990/91 CBE 100263 86926 13337 39.2 
 DBE 81888 103904 -22016 -141.1 
 CBB 12391 12695 -304 -6.3 
 PRIVATE - - -  
 ALL BANKS 194542 203525 -8983 -108.2 
1991/92 CBE 120687 84849 35838 98.4 
 DBE 80655 160991 -80336 -507.2 
 CBB 12476 12320 156 5.5 
 PRIVATE - - -  
 ALL BANKS 213818 258160 -44342 -403.3 
1992/93 CBE 193301 141705 51596 40.6 
 DBE 93328 207309 -113981 -690.8 
 CBB 9927 9724 203 5.0 
 PRIVATE - - -  
 ALL BANKS 296556 358738 -62182 -645.2 
 CBE 288614 120931 167683 115.2 
 DBE 31839 42564 -10725 -57.9 
1993/94 CBB 388 8554 -8166 -74.3 
 PRIVATE - - -  
 ALL BANKS 320841 172049 148792 -17.0 
 CBE 427728 217350 210378 72.9 
 DBE 52599 17285 35314 105.0 
1994/95 CBB 12457 10430 2027 17.6 
 PRIVATE(Awash) 6537 3423 3114  
 ALL BANKS 499321 248488 250833 195.5 
 CBE 535154 178234 356920 103.9 
 DBE 73863 19810 54053 120.7 
1995/96 CBB 25798 16989 8809 42.1 
 PRIVATE(Awash 15442 8627 6821  
 ALL BANKS 650257 223654 426603 266.7 
 CBE 548272 514483 33789 11.2 
 DBE 66318 50649 15669 26.3 
1996/97 CBB 22903 20692 2211 12.3 
 PRIVATE 45890 35927 9963 41.5 
 ALL BANKS 683383 621751 61632 91.3 
 CBE 779169 458023 321146 124.2 
 DBE** 79338 53776 25562 22.5 
1997/98 CBB 28230 21100 7130 113.2 
 PRIVATE 58712 45628 13084 16.5 
 ALL BANKS 945449 578527 366922 276.4 
 
Source. NBE and table 15 
*Fiscal year ending: June income statement (Audited) 
** 1997/98 figure for DBE was not audited. 
*** Two newly established private banks are excluded. 
  
 
The major share in the total expense account of banks was interest payment accounting 
for 50.7% per year on average during 1989/90-1996/97. The proportion of interest 
income to the total income of all banks accounted for 82% per annum on average during 
the same period. Thus, the analysis of the structure of income and expense accounts is 
predominately justified by the interest income and expense. 
 
The last two years before the reform and the first two years after the reform exhibited 
loss in all banks due to loss posted by the DBE. The CBE, the dominant institution in the 
banking industry, has made a significant profit throughout the year under consideration. 
The annual average growth rate of the net profit of CBE was 160.8% during 1989/90-
1997/98. The growth in the profit was mainly attributed to the interest rate reform.  
 
The DBE has registered a significant loss during 1989/90 to 1993/94 because of low 
interest rate mainly for agricultural sector for which the bank was established. 
Provision for doubtful loans were also very large on the expense accounts. However, 
after the elimination of interest rate discrimination among sectors since August 1994, 
the bank has made a large net profit. The annual average growth of net profit per loan 
of the DBE was 50.9% for four years since 1994/95. The CBB has made a net profit 
except for the loss it exhibited in 1990/91 and 1993/94. Thus, the net profit per loan of 
all banks grew by annual average rate of 355.8% for four years after the loss they had 
made for five years since 1989/90. Hence, the operational efficiency of the banking 
sector was improved in terms of profitability in the last few years although financial 
liberalization mostly leads to lower profit after reform period due to increased 
competition. 
 
 
4.5.3 Productivity of banks 
One of the indicators of productivity is the deposit mobilized or loan disbursed per 
employee in the banking industry. An employee mobilized deposits amounting Birr 0.108 
million on average before the reform beginning 1983/84 rose to Birr 0.234 million on 
average after the reform. 
 
 Table 19a: Total Deposits and Loans per Employee (Pre-reform) 
  1983/84 1984/8
5 
1985/8
6 
1986/8
7 
1987/8
8 
1988/8
9 
1989/9
0 
1990/9
1 
Aver. 
(real ) 
CB
E 
Deposit 2311 2684 2978 3264 3571 3777 4202 4415  
 Loan 643 404 361 411 439 416 338 340  
 No of 
employees 
4080 4325 4459 4570 4700 4829 4894 4856  
 Deposit/e
mp. 
0.57 0.62 0.67 0.71 0.76 0.78 0.86 0.91 0.116 
 Loan/emp. 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.014 
DB
E 
Deposit 49 50 48 132 135 137 183 185  
 Loan 363 300 345 301 343 330 316 156  
 No of 
employees 
3.80 404 433 521 593 670 723 775  
 Deposit/e
mp. 
0.13 0.12 0.11 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.031 
 Loan/emp. 0.96 0.74 0.80 0.58 0.58 0.49 0.44 0.20 0.094 
CB
B 
Deposit 213 223 236 320 376 441 469 521  
 Loan 49 39 20 36 110 74 78 48  
 No of 
employees 
315 323 348 425 443 470 510 547  
 Deposit/e
mp. 
0.66 0.69 0.68 0.75 0.85 0.94 0.92 0.95 0.0127
 Loan/emp. 0.16 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.09 0.020 
All 
Ban
ks 
Total 
deposit 
2573 2957 3262 3716 4082 4355 4854 5121  
 Total loan 1055 744 726 749 892 820 732 544  
 No of 
employee 
4775 5052 5240 5516 5736 5969 6127 6138  
 Deposit/e
mp. 
0.54 0.59 0.62 0.67 0.71 0.73 0.79 0.83 0.108 
 Loan/emp. 0.22 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 19b: Total Deposits and Loans per Employee (Post-reform) 
 
  1991/92 1992/9
3 
1993/9
4 
1994/9
5 
1995/9
6 
1996/9
7 
1997/9
8 
1998/9
9 
Ave. 
(real
) 
CB
E 
Deposit 5022 6228 7436 9596 11194 12702 15518 15017  
 Loan 364 1271 1455 2887 3437 3005 2586 2501  
 No of 
employees 
4691 4771 4660 4538 4733 4899 5159 5718  
 Deposit/e
mp. 
1.07 1.31 1.60 2.12 2.37 2.59 3.01 2.63 0.33
9 
 Loan/emp. 0.08 0.27 0.31 0.64 0.73 0.61 0.50 0.44 0.07
3 
DB
E 
Deposit 165 163 170 86 10 38 632 776  
 Loan 158 165 185 336 448 595 1138 840  
 No of 
employees 
781 803 761 805 840 875 842 803  
 Deposit/e
mp. 
0.21 0.20 0.22 0.12 0.01 0.04 0.75 0.97 0.05
2 
 Loan/emp. 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.42 0.53 0.68 0.35 1.05 0.09
6 
CB
B 
Deposit 485 359 386 393 409 557 568 554  
 Loan 28 40 110 115 209 179 63 34  
 No of 
employees 
539 559 570 571 617 668 667 -  
 Deposit/e
mp. 
0.90 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.66 0.83 0.85 - 0.12
2 
 Loan/emp. 0.05 0.07 0.19 0.20 0.34 0.27 0.09  0.02
8 
All Total 5672 6750 7992 10075 11613 13297 16718 16347  
Ban
ks 
deposit 
 Total loan 551 1476 1750 3338 4094 3779 3787 3375  
 No of 
employee 
6011 6133 5991 5914 6190 6442 6668 -  
 Deposit/e
mployee 
0.94 1.10 1.33 1.70 1.88 2.06 2.51 - 0.23
4 
 Loan/emp. 0.09 0.24 0.29 0.56 0.66 0.59 0.57  0.07
0 
 
Source NBE, CBE, DBE, CBB, and table 1. 
 The improvement in the productivity of workers in the banking industry has shown 
increasing trend regarding deposit mobilization. This was mainly attributed to deposit 
mobilize per worker in the CBE with average annual amount of Birr 0.116 million during 
the pre-reform period increased to Birr 0.339 million during the post reform period. 
There was also an improvement in the productivity of employees regarding deposit 
mobilization in the DBE with annual average amount of Birr 0.031 million per worker 
before the reform to Birr 0.052 million per worker after the reform. 
 
Total loan disbursed by each employee which was Birr 0.024 million on average per 
year during the pre-reform rose to Birr 0.070 million during the post reform period 
ending 1997/98. This was mostly reflected in the increase of loan per worker in the 
CBE from annual average amount of Birr 0.014 million before the reform to Birr 0.073 
million after the reform ending 1998/99. Loans disbursed by each employee also 
increased in both the CBB and DBE. 
 
Thus, there was increase in the productivity of workers in the banking industry 
regarding deposit mobilization and credit disbursement. Hence, there was an 
improvement in the operational efficiency of banking sector. The main factors that 
contributed for the improvement of productivity were: 
1. The increasing use of computer technology that improves the efficiency of workers 
with a small increase in the number of employees.  
2. Increased training programs, mainly arranged by the Ethiopian Institute of Banking 
and Insurance with emphasis on commercial banking operations, and 
3. The positive real rate of interest encouraged savings to be mobilized and hence 
credits to be disbursed. 
 
4.5.4 Loan collection 
 
Following the reform program, the government found that the collection of loans that 
had remained unpaid during the previous regime as important issue. Loan recovery 
recognized as the most important factor affecting the profitability of banks. In terms of 
institutional disaggregation, the most important sector in repaying its loans was the 
private sector that accounted for about 66% of the total after the reform ending 
1994/95 Jumped from 44% before the reform beginning 1987/88 in the CBE. However, 
the most important borrowers in repaying their loans in the DBE were cooperatives 
before the reform and public enterprises after the reform. The share of loan repayment 
mainly depends on the volume of loan disbursement to each borrower. The majority of 
credit disbursed was to public enterprises for which its repayment was not that much 
higher in the CBE and even lower than cooperatives in the DBE before the reform.  
Table 20a: Loan collection by sector and Beneficiaries (Pre-reform)  
         (Million Birr) 
CBE 1987/8
8 
1988/8
9 
1989/9
0 
1990/9
1 
Ave. 
growth 
Agriculture 62.2 39.5 20.8 5.0 7.7 
Industry 43.9 43.1 66.5 59.3 13.9 
Domestic trade 85.6 147 106.2 132.3 30.5 
Export 49.1 53.5 56.7 27.9 13.2 
Import 100.3 71.4 31.1 39.6 15.3 
Hotels & Tourism 8.9 8.6 11.8 12.6 2.8 
Transport & 
communication 
20.2 45.9 37 26.5 8.3 
Building & 
construction 
18.3 12.7 11.8 5.9 3.1 
Private(personal) 12 7.2 14.4 18.1 3.4 
Other services 4.2 5.6 6.9 7.7 1.6 
Total 404.8 435.4 384.2 335.8 100% 
growth rate %  7.6% -11.8% -12.6% - 
Private  152.9 162.7 182.9 170.6 43.5 
Public 185.0 216.8 163.5 124.5 43.9 
Cooperatives  66.8 55.0 36.5 39.8 12.6 
DBE      
Agriculture 147.47 111.52 119.24 82.62 72.6 
Industry 35.35 16.34 23.23 45.75 19.0 
Others 5.35 9.79 15.08 21.35 8.4 
Total 188.17 137.65 157.55 149.72 100% 
Growth rate %  -26.8 14.5 -5.0 - 
* public 68.9 35.2 56.2 40.2 43.8 
*cooperatives 53.4 63.95 66.4 54.7 53.4 
*private 2.1 2.4 3.7 4.0 2.8 
Total 124.4 101.55 126.3 98.9 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 20b: Loan collection by sector and Beneficiaries (post-reform) 
         (Million Birr) 
CBE 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 Ave. 
Growt
h 
Agriculture 4.8 3.5 31.94 214.14 295.38 258.3 282.0 7.1 
Industry 43.4 133.2 355.8 254.8 220.9 184.7 152.3 14.3 
Domestic trade 131.6 217 522.85 974.12 999.03 1132.8 810.9 41.0 
Export 36.4 46.8 127.47 90.93 204.93 229.43 198.1 8.4 
Import 14.2 33.8 67.77 166.11 230.52 275.3 246.5 7.8 
Hotels & 
Tourism 
17.3 30.9 64.6 101.4 166.8 101.9 83.9 5.1 
Transport & 
communication 
25.8 24.4 68.15 98.4 201.7 258.5 253.2 7.3 
Building & 
construction 
27.4 8.33 19.15 13.9 14.35 22.14 27.29 2.1 
Private(persona
l) 
11.6 18.2 28.7 32.5 32.75 32.46 31.57 2.1 
Other services 15.3 19.3 48.97 93.66 116.69 164.29 127.1 4.7 
Total 329.9 537.1 1335.4 2039.96 2483.05 2659.82 2212.86 100% 
Growth rate % -1.8% 62.8% 148.6% 52.8% 21.7% 7.1% -16.8% - 
Private  207.4 326.9 858.4 1517.0 - - - 65.9 
Public 109.7 160.1 422.2 282.6    27.3 
Cooperatives  12.1 49.2 36.0 239.4 - - - 6.8 
DBE         
Agriculture 53.25 61.72 32.8 139.6 174.2 296.8 330.9 52.2 
Industry 11.91 42.02 63.2 73.8 108.35 110.5 121.1 30.1 
Others 18.83 25.68 35.0 15.5 31.91 31.4 45.8 14.7 
Total 83.99 129.4 131.6 228.9 314.6 438.7 497.8 100% 
Growth rate % -40.6 45.4 1.7 73.9 37.4 39.4 13.5 - 
* public 50.95 82.1 96.8 55.2 88.7 59.3  46.1 
*cooperatives 14.5 25.0 27.0 128.8 156.0 238.2  36.4 
*private 3.6 22.3 7.8 44.9 69.9 141.2  17.1 
Total 69.1       100% 
 
Source: Alemayehu (1999) and DBE: Annual Report  
Note: for lack data, 1987/88 – 1991/92 institutional disaggregation is based on principal repayment 
only.  
 
 
The CBE disbursed the majority of loans mostly to the private sector and also collected 
the highest proportion from this sector after the reform. This reflects the increase in 
the efficiency of loan collection by the banks as well as repayment readiness of private 
individuals and businesses. 
 
Before the reform, the CBE disbursed the majority of its loans to the import sector but 
collected only half the share of loan collection from the domestic trade. However, the 
CBE disbursed the largest portion of its loans to the domestic trade and collected the 
highest share from the same sector (41%) after the reform. The annual average rate of 
loan collection was declined by 5.6% in the CBE and 5.8% in the DBE before the reform. 
However, the loan collection grew at 39.2% in the CBE and 24.5% in the DBE after the 
reform. This also shows an improvement in loan collection by the banks and increasing 
tendency of repayment by the borrowers. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
         5.1. Conclusion 
 
The miserable underdevelopment of Ethiopian economy is mainly attributed to policy 
failure in the last decades. In addition to very poor performance of the overall economy 
observed in the last decades, there has been no change in the structure of the economy. 
The real GDP grew at an annual average rate of only 1% substantially behind the 
population growth rate of 3%, leading to the net decline in per capital income of about 
2% in the last eight years of the previous government. However, an improvement in the 
economic performance has been registered after the economic reform in 1992/93. The 
annual average growth rate of real GDP was 5.8% in the last eight years (1992/93-
1998/99). 
 
The performance of the financial sector is one of the special phenomenon that 
accounted for a large part in the overall economic development. Thus, the main purpose 
of this study is to compare and contrast the performance of the financial sector before 
and after the economic reform.  
 
The share of bank claims on the central government reduced from 67% in 1990/91 to 
45% in 1998/99 indicating the reduction of the crowding out effect of government 
borrowing from banking system. The foreign assets of the banking sector have 
increasingly become the important determinant of the expansion of M2 which accounted 
for 0.7% of M2 in 1989/90 rose to 33% in 1994/95. 
 
The growth in the M2 did not consistent with the growth in the nominal GDP before the 
reform. This growth was mainly attributed to the growth in M1 as the result of faster 
growth in the currency in circulation. The growth in the Quasi money is associated with 
the faster growth in saving deposit (20%) and time deposit (30%) after the reform for 
which the saving deposit was growing at the rate of 13% and time deposit was declining 
at 5% before the reform. The faster growth in saving and time deposits during the post-
reform period was primarily characterized by the interest rate reform. Thus, financial 
liberalization encourages people to hold their financial assets in the form of saving and 
time deposits rather than cash.   
 With regard to mobilizing bank, especially for non-government deposits, the annual 
average growth rate of total deposit was 10.4% mainly associated with the growth in 
saving deposit (12%) in which the demand deposit and time deposit were growing at 
slower rate of 9.6% and 6% respectively before the reform. Deposit mobilization had 
gained greater momentum in CBE and DBE after the reform mostly due to the growth in 
the CBE from 9.8% during pre-reform period to 16.9% during the post-reform period. 
The CBE, Ethiopia’s dominant banking institution particularly in terms of deposit 
mobilization and credit operation, accounted for about 88% of total deposit on average 
before the reform and about 91% after the reform. However, it has shown declining 
trend in the very recent years after the emergence of private banks since 1994/95. The 
pre-reform period witnessed higher growth in the annual flow of funds to the 
specialized banks (DBE& CBB), owing to the forced saving by some institutions at 
deposit rate far below the market cleaning to provide credit to socialized sectors at 
subsidized interest rate. 
 
As far as sectroral disaggregation is concerned, the share of total deposits of private 
business enterprises and individuals in the total deposits of CBE was 52.8% in 1990/91 
and 55.9% in 1996/97. This indicates that the private sector is he biggest source of 
funds in the CBE. 
 
In general, the major factor that seem to have contributed to the growth of deposits 
after the reform in the absence of other alternative high-yielding monetary instruments, 
was keeping the real deposit rate positive which encouraged savers to gain real return 
on their deposits. Thus, there is no doubt that financial liberalization has increased 
savings in the financial assets of Ethiopia. 
 
However, the financial liberalization contributed very small amount on the national 
saving. The national saving as a percent of GDP was 10.2% per year on average before 
the reform rose to 13.1% during post-reform period predominantly as the result of the 
growing transfer from other countries to support the reform program. Although the 
financial liberalization contributed negligible amount to the national savings, it has 
shown an in improvement in the allocative efficiency of the financial sector. 
 
Keeping the nominal lending rate artificially lower than the market clearing was invited 
the diversion of credit from the most efficient investment by the private sector to the 
inefficient public enterprises and state farms. The reform measures have been 
successful in shifting the flow of credit to the more efficient sectors, which is evidenced 
by the change in the structure of the credit disbursement after the reform. The annual 
average share of credit for the private sector rose from 28% before the reform to 
70.4% after the reform while that of public enterprises reduced from 57.7% during pre-
reform period to 17% during the post reform period. The main reason for this change 
was the removal of restriction on the private sector coupled with the on going 
privatization of public enterprises and limited new investment in these enterprises.  
 
The annual average growth of total credit has shown increasing trend at the rate of 
38.4% after the reform, from 7.7% declining rate during the pre-reform period. Owing 
to the elimination of discriminatory credit to public enterprises and state farms through 
the specialized banks, a significant portion of loans came from the CBE; accounting for 
75% per annum after the reform rose from 54% before reform. The share of private 
banks in their three years of credit operation has reached 22% in 1998/99 for which it 
was 6% and 17% respectively in the previous years, much higher than their deposit 
mobilization. 
 
The majority of credit was channeled to the domestic trade (31%) followed by the 
industrial sector (16%) after the reform, which was directed to the agricultural sector 
(33%) through interest rate subsidy before the reform. This reflects the diversion of 
financial resources to the most efficient investment activity in the domestic trade and 
industrial sector after the reform from the inefficient investment in the agricultural 
sector, essentially the state farm that absorbed the majority of credit disbursed before 
the reform. The reform did not only improve the quality of investment but also it 
increased the quantity of investment explained by a significant increase in the volume 
of credit disbursed. The amount of credit disbursed rose from Birr 0.6 billion in 1991/92 
to Birr 4.2 billion in 1998/99(seven fold in eight years). It is safe to conclude that much 
of the increased credit came from the funds that was revolving in the informal market 
due to low real deposit rate in the formal financial sector before the reform. Thus, the 
financial liberalization improved the allocative efficiency in Ethiopia. 
 
Regarding the operational efficiency of banking system, the net profit of banks grew by 
an annual average rate of 178% for the last five years after the loss made for four 
years since 1989/90. This growth is predominantly associated with a significant profit 
made by the CBE, which grew at annual average rate of 161% during 1989/90 to 
1997/98, mainly due to interest rate reform. There was also an improvement in the 
productivity of workers in the banking industry. The annual average loan disbursed by 
each employee rose from Birr 0.024 million before the reform to Birr 0.070 million after 
the reform. The deposit mobilized per employee also increased from Birr 0.108 million 
to Birr 0.234 million during the same period. 
 
However, there was no improvement in the operational efficiency with regard to 
interest rate margin. Since interest rate was not fully liberalized, the cost of financial 
intermediation was fluctuating in the last few years. 
 
Although the interest rate was much higher than the formal financial institutions, the 
informal financial sector was the only source of funds for the restricted sector before 
the reform. Even after the reform the rural people have been using the informal sector. 
It was estimated that ‘iqqub’ funds accounted for 8-10% of GDP in 1995. The informal 
financial transaction was about Birr 7.2 billion in 1998, which was 41% of the deposit 
mobilized and 157% of the credit disbursed in the formal institutions in the same year. 
Thus, the role of informal financial sector should not be neglected in the financial 
system of Ethiopia.  The Saving and Credit Associations and NGOs are semi-formal` 
institutions that were increasing in the last periods.      
 
5.2. Recommendation 
 
It is widely accepted that financial liberalization is the most efficient way for the overall 
development of an economy. However, this is a long-run target to be persued and 
depends on the existing situation of a country. Although there was significant 
improvement in the financial intermediation after the reform the financial system is still 
underdeveloped in Ethiopia. The main problems are: - 
 
1) The commercial Bank of Ethiopia extremely dominates the banking system,  
2) The financial system is highly undiversified with regard to financial institutions and 
financial instruments. The country has no financial institutions such as investment 
and trust companies and postal savings system. There is also underdevelopment of 
money and capital market instruments, 
3) The capital bases of recently introduced micro-financial institutions and private 
banks are low, 
4) Low competition among financial institutions 
5) Still low operational efficiency in the banking industry due to shortage of technical 
skills for financial operation as well as lack of appropriate technology, 
6) There is still low repayment performance by the borrowers and financial resource 
mis-match for Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) and Construction and Business 
Bank (CBB).  Therefore, there is shortage of fund to extend long-term loans. The 
DBE and CBB are supposed to accept short-term deposits and extend loans for 
long-terms.  
How to find the most suitable policy is a difficult task. However, in order to achieve 
financial efficiency and financial stability simultaneously, the government should make 
further effort to search for optimum policy. Thus,  
 
1) To improve efficiency in the financial sector, it needs further deregulation of 
interest rate so that the cost of financial intermediation can be narrower than the 
existing interest rate margin. Further more, the financial resource revolving in the 
informal financial market can further be flow into the formal financial market if the 
deposit rate is deregulated. Competition among financial institutions is also 
enhanced for the successful completion of the liberalization. 
 
2) Strengthening the supervisory capacity of the National Bank of Ethiopia is required 
to avoid financial instability. A sound supervisory system and prudential regulation 
combined with well-designed sequence of financial liberalization are essential in the 
financial sector to prevent bank panic. 
 
Diversification of financial institutions and financial instruments are very important for 
financial deepening and economic development of Ethiopia. 
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